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Atmosphere/exosphere/src/smc_api.c

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#include <stdatomic.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
#include "utils.h"
#include "memory_map.h"
#include "configitem.h"
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#include "cpu_context.h"
#include "synchronization.h"
#include "masterkey.h"
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#include "mc.h"
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#include "memory_map.h"
#include "pmc.h"
#include "randomcache.h"
#include "sealedkeys.h"
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#include "smc_api.h"
#include "smc_user.h"
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#include "se.h"
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#include "userpage.h"
#include "titlekey.h"
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#include "lp0.h"
#include "exocfg.h"
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#define SMC_USER_HANDLERS 0x13
#define SMC_PRIV_HANDLERS 0x9
/* User SMC prototypes */
uint32_t smc_set_config(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_get_config(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_check_status(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_get_result(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_get_random_bytes_for_user(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_load_aes_key(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_compute_cmac(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args);
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uint32_t smc_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args);
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uint32_t smc_load_titlekey(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args);
/* 5.x SMC prototypes. */
uint32_t smc_encrypt_rsa_key_for_import(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_decrypt_or_import_rsa_key(smc_args_t *args);
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/* Privileged SMC prototypes */
uint32_t smc_cpu_suspend(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_cpu_off(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_cpu_on(smc_args_t *args);
/* uint32_t smc_get_config(smc_args_t *args); */
uint32_t smc_get_random_bytes_for_priv(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_panic(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_configure_carveout(smc_args_t *args);
uint32_t smc_read_write_register(smc_args_t *args);
typedef struct {
uint32_t id;
uint32_t (*handler)(smc_args_t *args);
} smc_table_entry_t;
typedef struct {
smc_table_entry_t *handlers;
uint32_t num_handlers;
} smc_table_t;
static smc_table_entry_t g_smc_user_table[SMC_USER_HANDLERS] = {
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{0, NULL},
{0xC3000401, smc_set_config},
{0xC3000002, smc_get_config},
{0xC3000003, smc_check_status},
{0xC3000404, smc_get_result},
{0xC3000E05, smc_exp_mod},
{0xC3000006, smc_get_random_bytes_for_user},
{0xC3000007, smc_generate_aes_kek},
{0xC3000008, smc_load_aes_key},
{0xC3000009, smc_crypt_aes},
{0xC300000A, smc_generate_specific_aes_key},
{0xC300040B, smc_compute_cmac},
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{0xC300100C, smc_load_rsa_oaep_key},
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{0xC300100D, smc_decrypt_rsa_private_key},
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{0xC300100E, smc_load_secure_exp_mod_key},
{0xC300060F, smc_secure_exp_mod},
{0xC3000610, smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey},
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{0xC3000011, smc_load_titlekey},
{0xC3000012, smc_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey}
};
static smc_table_entry_t g_smc_priv_table[SMC_PRIV_HANDLERS] = {
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{0, NULL},
{0xC4000001, smc_cpu_suspend},
{0x84000002, smc_cpu_off},
{0xC4000003, smc_cpu_on},
{0xC3000004, smc_get_config}, /* NOTE: Same function as for USER */
{0xC3000005, smc_get_random_bytes_for_priv},
{0xC3000006, smc_panic},
{0xC3000007, smc_configure_carveout},
{0xC3000008, smc_read_write_register}
};
static smc_table_t g_smc_tables[2] = {
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{ /* SMC_HANDLER_USER */
g_smc_user_table,
SMC_USER_HANDLERS
},
{ /* SMC_HANDLER_PRIV */
g_smc_priv_table,
SMC_PRIV_HANDLERS
}
};
static atomic_flag g_is_user_smc_in_progress = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
static atomic_flag g_is_priv_smc_in_progress = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
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/* Global for smc_configure_carveout. */
static bool g_configured_carveouts[2] = {false, false};
void set_version_specific_smcs(void) {
switch (exosphere_get_target_firmware()) {
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_100:
/* 1.0.0 doesn't have ConfigureCarveout or ReadWriteRegister. */
g_smc_priv_table[7].handler = NULL;
g_smc_priv_table[8].handler = NULL;
/* 1.0.0 doesn't have UnwrapAesWrappedTitlekey. */
g_smc_user_table[0x12].handler = NULL;
break;
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_200:
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_300:
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400:
/* Do nothing. */
break;
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500:
/* No more LoadSecureExpModKey. */
g_smc_user_table[0xE].handler = NULL;
g_smc_user_table[0xC].id = 0xC300D60C;
g_smc_user_table[0xC].handler = smc_encrypt_rsa_key_for_import;
g_smc_user_table[0xD].handler = smc_decrypt_or_import_rsa_key;
break;
default:
panic_predefined(0xF);
}
}
uintptr_t get_smc_core012_stack_address(void) {
return TZRAM_GET_SEGMENT_ADDRESS(TZRAM_SEGMENT_ID_CORE012_STACK) + 0x1000;
}
uintptr_t get_exception_entry_stack_address(unsigned int core_id) {
/* For core3, this is also the smc stack */
if (core_id == 3) {
return TZRAM_GET_SEGMENT_ADDRESS(TZRAM_SEGMENT_ID_CORE3_STACK) + 0x1000;
}
else {
return TZRAM_GET_SEGMENT_ADDRESS(TZRAM_SEGEMENT_ID_SECMON_EVT) + 0x80 * (core_id + 1);
}
}
bool try_set_user_smc_in_progress(void) {
return lock_try_acquire(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
}
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void set_user_smc_in_progress(void) {
lock_acquire(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
}
void clear_user_smc_in_progress(void) {
lock_release(&g_is_user_smc_in_progress);
}
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/* Privileged SMC lock must be available to exceptions.s. */
void set_priv_smc_in_progress(void) {
lock_acquire(&g_is_priv_smc_in_progress);
}
void clear_priv_smc_in_progress(void) {
lock_release(&g_is_priv_smc_in_progress);
}
uint32_t (*g_smc_callback)(void *, uint64_t) = NULL;
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uint64_t g_smc_callback_key = 0;
uint64_t try_set_smc_callback(uint32_t (*callback)(void *, uint64_t)) {
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uint64_t key;
if (g_smc_callback_key) {
return 0;
}
se_generate_random(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_RNGKEY, &key, sizeof(uint64_t));
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g_smc_callback_key = key;
g_smc_callback = callback;
return key;
}
void clear_smc_callback(uint64_t key) {
if (g_smc_callback_key == key) {
g_smc_callback_key = 0;
}
}
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void call_smc_handler(uint32_t handler_id, smc_args_t *args) {
unsigned char smc_id;
unsigned int result;
unsigned int (*smc_handler)(smc_args_t *args);
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/* Validate top-level handler. */
if (handler_id != SMC_HANDLER_USER && handler_id != SMC_HANDLER_PRIV) {
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generic_panic();
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}
/* Validate core is appropriate for handler. */
if (handler_id == SMC_HANDLER_USER && get_core_id() != 3) {
/* USER SMCs must be called via svcCallSecureMonitor on core 3 (where spl runs) */
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generic_panic();
}
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/* Validate sub-handler index */
if ((smc_id = (unsigned char)args->X[0]) >= g_smc_tables[handler_id].num_handlers) {
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generic_panic();
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}
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/* Validate sub-handler */
if (g_smc_tables[handler_id].handlers[smc_id].id != args->X[0]) {
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generic_panic();
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}
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/* Validate handler. */
if ((smc_handler = g_smc_tables[handler_id].handlers[smc_id].handler) == NULL) {
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generic_panic();
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}
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/* Call function. */
args->X[0] = smc_handler(args);
if (args->X[0])
{
MAKE_REG32(get_iram_address_for_debug() + 0x4FF0) = handler_id;
MAKE_REG32(get_iram_address_for_debug() + 0x4FF4) = smc_id;
MAKE_REG32(get_iram_address_for_debug() + 0x4FF8) = get_core_id();
*(volatile smc_args_t *)(get_iram_address_for_debug() + 0x4F00) = *args;
panic(PANIC_REBOOT);
}
(void)result; /* FIXME: result unused */
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}
uint32_t smc_wrapper_sync(smc_args_t *args, uint32_t (*handler)(smc_args_t *)) {
uint32_t result;
if (!try_set_user_smc_in_progress()) {
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return 3;
}
result = handler(args);
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
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return result;
}
uint32_t smc_wrapper_async(smc_args_t *args, uint32_t (*handler)(smc_args_t *), uint32_t (*callback)(void *, uint64_t)) {
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uint32_t result;
uint64_t key;
if (!try_set_user_smc_in_progress()) {
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return 3;
}
if ((key = try_set_smc_callback(callback)) != 0) {
result = handler(args);
if (result == 0) {
/* Pass the status check key back to userland. */
args->X[1] = key;
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/* Early return, leaving g_is_user_smc_in_progress locked */
return result;
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} else {
/* No status to check. */
clear_smc_callback(key);
}
} else {
/* smcCheckStatus needs to be called. */
result = 3;
}
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
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return result;
}
uint32_t smc_set_config(smc_args_t *args) {
/* Actual value presumed in X3 on hardware. */
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return configitem_set((ConfigItem)args->X[1], args->X[3]);
}
uint32_t smc_get_config(smc_args_t *args) {
uint64_t out_item = 0;
uint32_t result;
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result = configitem_get((ConfigItem)args->X[1], &out_item);
args->X[1] = out_item;
return result;
}
uint32_t smc_check_status(smc_args_t *args) {
if (g_smc_callback_key == 0) {
return 4;
}
if (args->X[1] != g_smc_callback_key) {
return 5;
}
args->X[1] = g_smc_callback(NULL, 0);
g_smc_callback_key = 0;
return 0;
}
uint32_t smc_get_result(smc_args_t *args) {
uint32_t status;
unsigned char result_buf[0x400];
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upage_ref_t page_ref;
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void *user_address = (void *)args->X[2];
if (g_smc_callback_key == 0) {
return 4;
}
if (args->X[1] != g_smc_callback_key) {
return 5;
}
/* Check result size */
if (args->X[3] > 0x400) {
return 2;
}
args->X[1] = g_smc_callback(result_buf, args->X[3]);
g_smc_callback_key = 0;
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/* Initialize page reference. */
if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0) {
return 2;
}
/* Copy result output back to user. */
if (secure_copy_to_user(&page_ref, user_address, result_buf, (size_t)args->X[3]) == 0) {
return 2;
}
return 0;
(void)status; /* FIXME: status unused */
}
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uint32_t smc_exp_mod_get_result(void *buf, uint64_t size) {
if (get_exp_mod_done() != 1) {
return 3;
}
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if (size != 0x100) {
return 2;
}
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se_get_exp_mod_output(buf, 0x100);
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/* smc_exp_mod is done now. */
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
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return 0;
}
uint32_t smc_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_async(args, user_exp_mod, smc_exp_mod_get_result);
}
uint32_t smc_get_random_bytes_for_user(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_get_random_bytes);
}
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uint32_t smc_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_generate_aes_kek);
}
uint32_t smc_load_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
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return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_load_aes_key);
}
uint32_t smc_crypt_aes_status_check(void *buf, uint64_t size) {
/* Buf and size are unused. */
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if (get_crypt_aes_done() != 1) {
return 3;
}
/* smc_crypt_aes is done now. */
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
return 0;
}
uint32_t smc_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_async(args, user_crypt_aes, smc_crypt_aes_status_check);
}
uint32_t smc_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_generate_specific_aes_key);
}
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uint32_t smc_compute_cmac(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_compute_cmac);
}
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uint32_t smc_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_load_rsa_oaep_key);
}
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uint32_t smc_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_decrypt_rsa_private_key);
}
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uint32_t smc_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_load_secure_exp_mod_key);
}
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uint32_t smc_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_async(args, user_secure_exp_mod, smc_exp_mod_get_result);
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}
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uint32_t smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey_get_result(void *buf, uint64_t size) {
uint64_t *p_sealed_key = (uint64_t *)buf;
uint8_t rsa_wrapped_titlekey[0x100];
uint8_t aes_wrapped_titlekey[0x10];
uint8_t titlekey[0x10];
uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2];
if (get_exp_mod_done() != 1) {
return 3;
}
if (size != 0x10) {
return 2;
}
se_get_exp_mod_output(rsa_wrapped_titlekey, 0x100);
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if (tkey_rsa_oaep_unwrap(aes_wrapped_titlekey, 0x10, rsa_wrapped_titlekey, 0x100) != 0x10) {
/* Failed to extract RSA OAEP wrapped key. */
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
return 2;
}
tkey_aes_unwrap(titlekey, 0x10, aes_wrapped_titlekey, 0x10);
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seal_titlekey(sealed_titlekey, 0x10, titlekey, 0x10);
p_sealed_key[0] = sealed_titlekey[0];
p_sealed_key[1] = sealed_titlekey[1];
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/* smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey is done now. */
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
return 0;
}
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uint32_t smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_async(args, user_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey, smc_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey_get_result);
}
uint32_t smc_load_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_load_titlekey);
}
uint32_t smc_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey);
}
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uint32_t smc_encrypt_rsa_key_for_import(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_encrypt_rsa_key_for_import);
}
uint32_t smc_decrypt_or_import_rsa_key(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, user_decrypt_or_import_rsa_key);
}
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uint32_t smc_cpu_on(smc_args_t *args) {
return cpu_on((uint32_t)args->X[1], args->X[2], args->X[3]);
}
uint32_t smc_cpu_off(smc_args_t *args) {
return cpu_off();
}
/* Wrapper for cpu_suspend */
uint32_t cpu_suspend_wrapper(smc_args_t *args) {
return cpu_suspend(args->X[1], args->X[2], args->X[3]);
}
uint32_t smc_cpu_suspend(smc_args_t *args) {
return smc_wrapper_sync(args, cpu_suspend_wrapper);
}
uint32_t smc_get_random_bytes_for_priv(smc_args_t *args) {
/* This is an interesting SMC. */
/* The kernel must NEVER be unable to get random bytes, if it needs them */
/* As such: */
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uint32_t result;
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if (!try_set_user_smc_in_progress()) {
if (args->X[1] > 0x38) {
return 2;
}
/* Retrieve bytes from the cache. */
size_t num_bytes = (size_t)args->X[1];
randomcache_getbytes(&args->X[1], num_bytes);
result = 0;
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} else {
/* If the kernel isn't denied service by a usermode SMC, generate fresh random bytes. */
result = user_get_random_bytes(args);
/* Also, refill our cache while we have the chance in case we get denied later. */
randomcache_refill();
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clear_user_smc_in_progress();
}
return result;
}
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uint32_t smc_read_write_register(smc_args_t *args) {
uint64_t address = args->X[1];
uint32_t mask = (uint32_t)(args->X[2]);
uint32_t value = (uint32_t)(args->X[3]);
volatile uint32_t *p_mmio = NULL;
/* Address must be aligned. */
if (address & 3) {
return 2;
}
/* Check for PMC registers. */
if (0x7000E400 <= address && address <= 0x7000EFFF) {
const uint8_t pmc_whitelist[0x28] = {
0xB9, 0xF9, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x03,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x17, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x07, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x20, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00
};
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/* Offset = Address - PMC_BASE */
uint32_t offset = (uint32_t)(address - 0x7000E400);
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uint32_t wl_ind = (offset >> 5);
/* If address is whitelisted, allow write. */
if (wl_ind < sizeof(pmc_whitelist) && (pmc_whitelist[wl_ind] & (1 << ((offset >> 2) & 0x7)))) {
p_mmio = (volatile uint32_t *)(PMC_BASE + offset);
} else {
return 2;
}
} else if (exosphere_get_target_firmware() >= EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400 && MMIO_GET_DEVICE_PA(MMIO_DEVID_MC) <= address &&
address < MMIO_GET_DEVICE_PA(MMIO_DEVID_MC) + MMIO_GET_DEVICE_SIZE(MMIO_DEVID_MC)) {
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/* Memory Controller RW supported only on 4.0.0+ */
const uint8_t mc_whitelist[0x68] = {
0x9F, 0x31, 0x30, 0x00, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0xF7, 0x01,
0xCD, 0xFE, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x03, 0x40, 0x73, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6E,
0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xC8, 0x43, 0x04,
0x80, 0x1F, 0x08, 0x80, 0x03, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x00,
0x08, 0x00, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0xF0, 0x03, 0x03, 0x30,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x31, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x01,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x0F,
0x01, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00
};
uint32_t offset = (uint32_t)(address - 0x70019000);
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uint32_t wl_ind = (offset >> 5);
/* If address is whitelisted, allow write. */
if (wl_ind < sizeof(mc_whitelist) && (mc_whitelist[wl_ind] & (1 << ((offset >> 2) & 0x7)))) {
p_mmio = (volatile uint32_t *)(MMIO_GET_DEVICE_ADDRESS(MMIO_DEVID_MC) + offset);
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} else {
/* These addresses are not allowed by the whitelist. */
/* They correspond to SMMU DISABLE for the BPMP, and for APB-DMA. */
/* However, smcReadWriteRegister returns 0 for these addresses despite not actually performing the write. */
/* This is "probably" to fuck with hackers who got access to smcReadWriteRegister and are trying to get */
/* control of the BPMP for jamais vu etc., since there's no other reason to return 0 despite failure. */
if (address == 0x7001923C || address == 0x70019298) {
return 0;
}
return 2;
}
}
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/* Perform actual write. */
if (p_mmio != NULL) {
uint32_t old_value;
/* Write whole value. */
if (mask == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
old_value = 0;
} else {
old_value = *p_mmio;
}
if (mask) {
*p_mmio = (old_value & ~mask) | (value & mask);
}
/* Return old value. */
args->X[1] = old_value;
return 0;
}
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return 2;
}
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uint32_t smc_configure_carveout(smc_args_t *args) {
unsigned int carveout_id = (unsigned int)args->X[1];
uint64_t address = args->X[2];
uint64_t size = args->X[3];
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/* Ensure carveout isn't too big. */
if (size > KERNEL_CARVEOUT_SIZE_MAX) {
return 2;
}
/* Ensure validity of carveout index. */
if (carveout_id > 1) {
return 2;
}
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/* Configuration is one-shot, and cannot be done multiple times. */
if (g_configured_carveouts[carveout_id]) {
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return 2;
}
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configure_kernel_carveout(carveout_id + 4, address, size);
g_configured_carveouts[carveout_id] = true;
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return 0;
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}
uint32_t smc_panic(smc_args_t *args) {
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/* Swap RGB values from args. */
uint32_t color = ((args->X[1] & 0xF) << 8) | ((args->X[1] & 0xF0)) | ((args->X[1] & 0xF00) >> 8);
panic((color << 20) | 0x40);
}