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Restore incorrectly deleted files

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This commit is contained in:
Michael Scire 2018-04-10 15:56:45 -06:00
parent d6806517c8
commit 87605563d2
4 changed files with 307 additions and 0 deletions
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18
fusee/fusee-secondary/src/exocfg.h Normal file
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#ifndef FUSEE_EXOSPHERE_CONFIG_H
#define FUSEE_EXOSPHERE_CONFIG_H
/* This serves to set configuration for *exosphere itself*, separate from the SecMon Exosphere mimics. */
/* "XBC0" */
#define MAGIC_EXOSPHERE_BOOTCONFIG (0x30434258)
#define EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_100 1
#define EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_200 2
#define EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_300 3
#define EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400 4
#define EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500 5
/* TODO: What should this be, for release? */
#define EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_DEFAULT_FOR_DEBUG EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400
#endif

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fusee/fusee-secondary/src/flow.h Normal file
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#ifndef FUSEE_FLOW_CTLR_H
#define FUSEE_FLOW_CTLR_H
#include "utils.h"
#define FLOW_BASE 0x60007000
#define MAKE_FLOW_REG(ofs) MAKE_REG32(FLOW_BASE + ofs)
#define FLOW_CTLR_HALT_COP_EVENTS_0 MAKE_FLOW_REG(0x004)
#define FLOW_CTLR_FLOW_DBG_QUAL_0 MAKE_FLOW_REG(0x050)
#define FLOW_CTLR_L2FLUSH_CONTROL_0 MAKE_FLOW_REG(0x094)
#define FLOW_CTLR_BPMP_CLUSTER_CONTROL_0 MAKE_FLOW_REG(0x098)
static const struct {
unsigned int CPUN_CSR_OFS;
unsigned int HALT_CPUN_EVENTS_OFS;
unsigned int CC4_COREN_CTRL_OFS;
} g_flow_core_offsets[NUM_CPU_CORES] = {
{0x008, 0x000, 0x06C},
{0x018, 0x014, 0x070},
{0x020, 0x01C, 0x074},
{0x028, 0x024, 0x078},
};
static inline void flow_set_cc4_ctrl(uint32_t core, uint32_t cc4_ctrl) {
MAKE_FLOW_REG(g_flow_core_offsets[core].CC4_COREN_CTRL_OFS) = cc4_ctrl;
}
static inline void flow_set_halt_events(uint32_t core, bool halt_events) {
MAKE_FLOW_REG(g_flow_core_offsets[core].HALT_CPUN_EVENTS_OFS) = (halt_events ? 0x40000F00 : 0x40000000);
}
static inline void flow_set_csr(uint32_t core, uint32_t csr) {
MAKE_FLOW_REG(g_flow_core_offsets[core].CPUN_CSR_OFS) = (0x100 << core) | (csr << 12) | 0xC001;
}
static inline void flow_clear_csr0_and_events(uint32_t core) {
MAKE_FLOW_REG(g_flow_core_offsets[core].CPUN_CSR_OFS) = 0;
MAKE_FLOW_REG(g_flow_core_offsets[core].HALT_CPUN_EVENTS_OFS) = 0;
}
#endif

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fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.c Normal file
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#include "key_derivation.h"
#include "se.h"
#include "exocfg.h"
#include "fuse.h"
static const u8 keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX][0x10] =
{
{0xDF, 0x20, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x44, 0x54, 0xEF, 0xDC, 0x70, 0x74, 0x48, 0x3B, 0x0D, 0xED, 0x9F, 0xD3}, /* Keyblob seed 00. */
{0x0C, 0x25, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x68, 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x42, 0x1C, 0x23, 0x79, 0xEA, 0x82, 0x25, 0x12, 0xAC}, /* Keyblob seed 01. */
{0x33, 0x76, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x88, 0x4A, 0xAE, 0x0A, 0xC2, 0x8A, 0xFD, 0x7D, 0x63, 0xC0, 0x43, 0x3B}, /* Keyblob seed 02. */
{0x2D, 0x1F, 0x48, 0x80, 0xED, 0xEC, 0xED, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xF2, 0x48, 0xB5, 0x65, 0x7D, 0xF7, 0xBE}, /* Keyblob seed 03. */
{0xBB, 0x5A, 0x01, 0xF9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xF5, 0xFC, 0x6C, 0xFF, 0x07, 0x9E, 0x13, 0x3C, 0x39, 0x80}, /* Keyblob seed 04. */
};
static const u8 keyblob_mac_seed[0x10] =
{
0x59, 0xC7, 0xFB, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x9B, 0xBE, 0x87, 0x65, 0x6B, 0x15, 0xC0, 0x53, 0x73, 0x36, 0xA5
};
static const uint8_t masterkey_seed[0x10] =
{
0xD8, 0xA2, 0x41, 0x0A, 0xC6, 0xC5, 0x90, 0x01, 0xC6, 0x1D, 0x6A, 0x26, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x3F, 0x3C
};
static const uint8_t devicekey_seed[0x10] =
{
0x4F, 0x02, 0x5F, 0x0E, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xDC, 0x32, 0x7D, 0x41, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xF4, 0x78
};
static const uint8_t devicekey_4x_seed[0x10] =
{
0x0C, 0x91, 0x09, 0xDB, 0x93, 0x93, 0x07, 0x81, 0x07, 0x3C, 0xC4, 0x16, 0x22, 0x7C, 0x6C, 0x28
};
static const uint8_t masterkey_4x_seed[0x10] =
{
0x2D, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x69, 0x33, 0x42, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xDA, 0x90, 0x46, 0x66
};
void get_tsec_key(void *dst) {
/* TODO: Implement this method. Attempt to read TSEC fw from NAND, or from SD if that fails. */
}
void get_keyblob(void *dst, u32 revision) {
if (revision >= 0x20) {
generic_panic();
}
/* TODO: Read the appropriate keyblob from eMMC Boot0 partition. */
}
bool safe_memcmp(u8 *a, u8 *b, u32 sz) {
u8 different = 0;
for (u32 i = 0; i < sz; i++) {
different |= a[i] ^ b[i];
}
return different != 0;
}
/* Derive all Switch keys. */
void derive_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware) {
u8 work_buffer[0x10];
nx_keyblob_t keyblob;
/* TODO: Set keyslot flags properly in preparation of derivation. */
set_aes_keyslot_flags(0xE, 0x15);
set_aes_keyslot_flags(0xD, 0x15);
/* Set TSEC key. */
get_tsec_key(work_buffer);
set_aes_keyslot(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10);
/* Get keyblob, always try to set up the highest possible master key. */
/* TODO: Should we iterate, trying lower keys on failure? */
get_keyblob(&keyblob, MASTERKEY_REVISION_500_CURRENT);
/* Derive both keyblob key 1, and keyblob key latest. */
se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_100_230], 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xF, 0xE, work_buffer, 0x10);
se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob_seeds[MASTERKEY_REVISION_500_CURRENT], 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xD, 0xE, work_buffer, 0x10);
/* Clear the SBK. */
clear_aes_keyslot(0xE);
se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(0xD, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob_mac_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xB, 0xD, keyblob_mac_seed, 0x10);
/* Validate keyblob. */
se_compute_aes_128_cmac(0xB, work_buffer, 0x10, keyblob.mac + sizeof(keyblob.mac), sizeof(keyblob) - sizeof(keyblob.mac));
if (safe_memcmp(keyblob.mac, work_buffer, 0x10)) {
generic_panic();
}
/* Decrypt keyblob. */
se_aes_ctr_crypt(0xD, keyblob.data, sizeof(keyblob.data), keyblob.data, sizeof(keyblob.data), keyblob.ctr, sizeof(keyblob.ctr));
/* Get needed data. */
set_aes_keyslot(0xC, keyblob.keys[0], 0x10);
/* We don't need the Package1 Key, but for reference: set_aes_keyslot(0xB, keyblob.keys[8], 0x10); */
/* Clear keyblob. */
memset(keyblob.data, 0, sizeof(keyblob.data));
/* Derive keys for Exosphere, lock critical keyslots. */
switch (target_firmware) {
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_100:
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_200:
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_300:
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xD, 0xF, devicekey_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xC, 0xC, masterkey_seed, 0x10);
break;
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400:
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xD, 0xF, devicekey_4x_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xF, 0xF, devicekey_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xE, 0xC, masterkey_4x_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xC, 0xC, masterkey_seed, 0x10);
break;
case EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500:
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xA, 0xF, devicekey_4x_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xF, 0xF, devicekey_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xE, 0xC, masterkey_4x_seed, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(0xC, 0xC, masterkey_seed, 0x10);
break;
default:
generic_panic();
}
}
/* Sets final keyslot flags, for handover to TZ/Exosphere. Setting these will prevent the BPMP from using the device key or master key. */
void finalize_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware) {
set_aes_keyslot_flags(0xC, 0xFF);
set_aes_keyslot_flags((target_firmware >= EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400) ? (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY) : (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY), 0xFF);
}
void fusee_generate_specific_aes_key(void *dst, const void *wrapped_key, bool should_mask, u32 target_firmware) {
unsigned int keyslot = (target_firmware >= EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400) ? (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY) : (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY);
if (fuse_get_bootrom_patch_version() < 0x7F) {
/* On dev units, use a fixed "all-zeroes" seed. */
/* Yes, this data really is all-zero in actual TrustZone .rodata. */
static const u8 dev_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
static const u8 dev_specific_aes_key_ctr[0x10] = {0x3C, 0xD5, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x68, 0x31, 0x4A, 0x06, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x0C, 0xD9, 0xF6, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0xE9};
static const u8 dev_specific_aes_key_mask[0x10] = {0xAC, 0xCA, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x21, 0x1E};
se_aes_ctr_crypt(keyslot, dst, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_ctr, 0x10);
if (should_mask) {
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) {
((u8 *)dst)[i] ^= dev_specific_aes_key_mask[i];
}
}
} else {
/* On retail, standard kek->key decryption. */
static const u8 retail_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0xE2, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0x7A, 0x11, 0x9C, 0xB8, 0x80, 0xE8, 0x22, 0x88, 0x8A, 0x46, 0xFB, 0xA1, 0x95};
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, retail_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10);
se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10);
}
}
void fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(void *dst, const void *wrapped_kek, const void *wrapped_key, u32 target_firmware) {
static const u8 kek_source[0x10] = {
0x4D, 0x87, 0x09, 0x86, 0xC4, 0x5D, 0x20, 0x72, 0x2F, 0xBA, 0x10, 0x53, 0xDA, 0x92, 0xE8, 0xA9
};
static const u8 key_source[0x10] = {
0x89, 0x61, 0x5E, 0xE0, 0x5C, 0x31, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x5F, 0xE5, 0x8F, 0x3D, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x7A, 0xA8
};
unsigned int keyslot = (target_firmware >= EXOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_400) ? (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY) : (KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY);
/* Derive kek. */
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, kek_source, 0x10);
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, wrapped_kek, 0x10);
/* Derive key. */
decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, key_source, 0x10);
se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, dst, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10);
}
void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition_t partition_id, u32 target_firmware) {
static const u8 key_source_for_bis[3][2][0x10] = {
{
{0xF8, 0x3F, 0x38, 0x6E, 0x2C, 0xD2, 0xCA, 0x32, 0xA8, 0x9A, 0xB9, 0xAA, 0x29, 0xBF, 0xC7, 0x48},
{0x7D, 0x92, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xDE, 0xE1, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x3B, 0x6E, 0x35, 0xCB, 0x71, 0x06}
},
{
{0x41, 0x00, 0x30, 0x49, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0xC0, 0x65, 0x64, 0x7A, 0x7E, 0xB4, 0x1E, 0xED, 0x9C, 0x5F},
{0x44, 0x42, 0x4E, 0xDA, 0xB4, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x77, 0x24, 0x9A, 0xDC, 0x9F, 0x7C, 0xA4}
},
{
{0x52, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0x09, 0xE3, 0xEE, 0x29, 0x32, 0xA1, 0x0C, 0x1F, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x92, 0x6C},
{0x4D, 0x12, 0xE1, 0x4B, 0x2A, 0x47, 0x4C, 0x1C, 0x09, 0xCB, 0x03, 0x59, 0xF0, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xE4}
}
};
static const u8 bis_kek_source[0x10] = {0x34, 0xC1, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x82, 0x58, 0xF8, 0xB4, 0xFA, 0x9E, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xFC, 0x7E, 0x4F};
switch (partition_id) {
case BisPartition_Calibration:
fusee_generate_specific_aes_key(dst, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][0], false, target_firmware);
fusee_generate_specific_aes_key(dst + 0x10, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][1], false, target_firmware);
break;
case BisPartition_User:
case BisPartition_System:
fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(dst, bis_kek_source, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][0], target_firmware);
fusee_generate_personalized_aes_key_for_bis(dst + 0x10, bis_kek_source, key_source_for_bis[partition_id][1], target_firmware);
break;
default:
generic_panic();
}
}

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fusee/fusee-secondary/src/key_derivation.h Normal file
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#ifndef FUSEE_KEYDERIVATION_H
#define FUSEE_KEYDERIVATION_H
#include "hwinit/tsec.h"
/* TODO: Update to 0x6 on release of new master key. */
#define MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX 0x5
#define MASTERKEY_REVISION_100_230 0x00
#define MASTERKEY_REVISION_300 0x01
#define MASTERKEY_REVISION_301_302 0x02
#define MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_410 0x03
#define MASTERKEY_REVISION_500_CURRENT 0x04
#define MASTERKEY_NUM_NEW_DEVICE_KEYS (MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX - MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_410)
typedef enum {
BisPartition_Calibration = 0,
BisPartition_User = 1,
BisPartition_System = 2
} BisPartition_t;
typedef struct {
u8 mac[0x10];
u8 ctr[0x10];
union {
u8 data[0x90];
u8 keys[9][0x10];
};
} nx_keyblob_t;
void derive_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware);
void finalize_nx_keydata(u32 target_firmware);
void derive_bis_key(void *dst, BisPartition_t partition_id, u32 target_firmware);
#endif