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exo/kern: 1.0.0 requires access to bpmp smmu regs, userland (am) needs to map bpmp exception vectors

This commit is contained in:
Michael Scire 2020-08-26 01:36:59 -07:00 committed by SciresM
parent 49af4fae32
commit cc6b8ea4d1
2 changed files with 23 additions and 11 deletions

View file

@ -155,10 +155,27 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
/* Find the access table. */
const AccessTableEntry * const entry = GetAccessTableEntry(address);
/* If we have a table, perform the write. */
/* Translate our entry into an address to access. */
uintptr_t virtual_address = 0;
if (entry != nullptr) {
/* Get the address to read or write. */
const uintptr_t virtual_address = entry->virtual_address + (address - entry->address);
virtual_address = entry->virtual_address + (address - entry->address);
} else {
/* For no clearly discernable reason, SmcReadWriteRegister returns success despite not doing the read/write */
/* when accessing the SMMU controls for the BPMP and for APB-DMA. */
/* This is "probably" to fuck with hackers who got access to the SMC and are trying to get control of the */
/* BPMP to exploit jamais vu, deja vu, or other related DMA/wake-from-sleep vulnerabilities. */
constexpr uintptr_t MC = MemoryRegionPhysicalDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress();
SMC_R_UNLESS((address == (MC + MC_SMMU_AVPC_ASID) || address == (MC + MC_SMMU_PPCS1_ASID)), InvalidArgument);
/* For backwards compatibility, we'll allow access to these devices on 1.0.0. */
if (GetTargetFirmware() < TargetFirmware_2_0_0) {
virtual_address = MemoryRegionVirtualDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress() + (address - MC);
}
}
/* Perform the read or write, if we should. */
if (virtual_address != 0) {
u32 out = 0;
if (mask != ~static_cast<u32>(0)) {
@ -169,13 +186,6 @@ namespace ams::secmon::smc {
}
args.r[1] = out;
} else {
/* For no clearly discernable reason, SmcReadWriteRegister returns success despite not doing the read/write */
/* when accessing the SMMU controls for the BPMP and for APB-DMA. */
/* This is "probably" to fuck with hackers who got access to the SMC and are trying to get control of the */
/* BPMP to exploit jamais vu, deja vu, or other related DMA/wake-from-sleep vulnerabilities. */
constexpr uintptr_t MC = MemoryRegionPhysicalDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress();
SMC_R_UNLESS((address == (MC + MC_SMMU_AVPC_ASID) || address == (MC + MC_SMMU_PPCS1_ASID)), InvalidArgument);
}
return SmcResult::Success;

View file

@ -70,8 +70,10 @@ namespace ams::kern {
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x50041000, 0x1000, KMemoryRegionType_InterruptDistributor | KMemoryRegionAttr_ShouldKernelMap));
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x50042000, 0x1000, KMemoryRegionType_InterruptCpuInterface | KMemoryRegionAttr_ShouldKernelMap));
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x50043000, 0x1D000, KMemoryRegionType_None | KMemoryRegionAttr_NoUserMap));
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x6000F000, 0x1000, KMemoryRegionType_None | KMemoryRegionAttr_NoUserMap));
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x6001DC00, 0x400, KMemoryRegionType_None | KMemoryRegionAttr_NoUserMap));
if (GetTargetFirmware() >= TargetFirmware_2_0_0) {
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x6000F000, 0x1000, KMemoryRegionType_None | KMemoryRegionAttr_NoUserMap));
MESOSPHERE_INIT_ABORT_UNLESS(KMemoryLayout::GetPhysicalMemoryRegionTree().Insert(0x6001DC00, 0x400, KMemoryRegionType_None | KMemoryRegionAttr_NoUserMap));
}
}
void SetupDramPhysicalMemoryRegions() {