/* * Copyright (c) 2018 Atmosphère-NX * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it * under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License, * version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation. * * This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT * ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for * more details. * * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License * along with this program. If not, see . */ #include #include "utils.h" #include "lp0.h" #include "secmon.h" #include "se.h" #include "pmc.h" /* "private" functions. */ static bool secmon_should_clear_aes_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot); static void secmon_clear_unused_keyslots(void); static void secmon_decrypt_saved_image(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size); void secmon_restore_to_tzram(const uint32_t target_firmware) { /* Newer warmboot binaries clear the untouched keyslots for safety. */ if (target_firmware >= ATMOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500) { secmon_clear_unused_keyslots(); } /* Decrypt Secure Monitor from DRAM into TZRAM. */ void *tzram_src = (void *)(0x80010000); void *tzram_dst = (void *)(target_firmware >= ATMOSPHERE_TARGET_FIRMWARE_500 ? 0x7C012000 : 0x7C010000); const size_t tzram_size = 0xE000; secmon_decrypt_saved_image(tzram_dst, tzram_src, tzram_size); /* Nintendo clears DRAM, but I'm not sure why, given they lock out BPMP access to DRAM. */ for (size_t i = 0; i < tzram_size/sizeof(uint32_t); i++) { ((volatile uint32_t *)tzram_src)[i] = 0; } /* Make security engine require secure busmaster. */ se_get_regs()->_0x4 = 0; /* TODO: stuff */ } void secmon_decrypt_saved_image(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) { /* First, AES-256-CBC decrypt the image into TZRAM. */ se_aes_256_cbc_decrypt(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_LP0TZRAMKEY, dst, size, src, size); /* Next, calculate CMAC. */ uint32_t tzram_cmac[4] = {0, 0, 0, 0}; se_compute_aes_256_cmac(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_LP0TZRAMKEY, tzram_cmac, sizeof(tzram_cmac), dst, size); /* Validate the MAC against saved one in PMC scratch. */ if (tzram_cmac[0] != APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH112_0 || tzram_cmac[1] != APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH113_0 || tzram_cmac[2] != APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH114_0 || tzram_cmac[3] != APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH115_0) { reboot(); } /* Clear the PMC scratch registers that hold the CMAC. */ APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH112_0 = 0; APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH113_0 = 0; APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH114_0 = 0; APBDEV_PMC_SECURE_SCRATCH115_0 = 0; /* Clear keyslot now that we're done with it. */ clear_aes_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_LP0TZRAMKEY); } bool secmon_should_clear_aes_keyslot(unsigned int keyslot) { /* We'll just compare keyslot against a hardcoded list of keys. */ static const uint8_t saved_keyslots[6] = { KEYSLOT_SWITCH_LP0TZRAMKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_SESSIONKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_RNGKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_MASTERKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY }; for (unsigned int i = 0; i < sizeof(saved_keyslots)/sizeof(saved_keyslots[0]); i++) { if (keyslot == saved_keyslots[i]) { return false; } } return true; } void secmon_clear_unused_keyslots(void) { /* Clear unused keyslots. */ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < KEYSLOT_AES_MAX; i++) { if (secmon_should_clear_aes_keyslot(i)) { clear_aes_keyslot(i); } clear_aes_keyslot_iv(i); } for (unsigned int i = 0; i < KEYSLOT_RSA_MAX; i++) { clear_rsa_keyslot(i); } }