mirror of
https://github.com/Atmosphere-NX/Atmosphere.git
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32238984bf
* smc_user: Fix syntax for size assignment in user_load_secure_exp_mod_key() and user_load_rsa_oaep_key() * smc_user: Fix include directive
612 lines
17 KiB
C
612 lines
17 KiB
C
#include <stdint.h>
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#include "utils.h"
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#include "cache.h"
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#include "configitem.h"
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#include "masterkey.h"
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#include "smc_api.h"
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#include "smc_user.h"
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#include "se.h"
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#include "sealedkeys.h"
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#include "userpage.h"
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#include "titlekey.h"
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/* Globals. */
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int g_crypt_aes_done = 0;
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int g_exp_mod_done = 0;
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uint8_t g_secure_exp_mod_exponent[0x100];
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uint8_t g_rsa_oaep_exponent[0x100];
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void set_exp_mod_done(int done) {
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g_exp_mod_done = done & 1;
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}
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int get_exp_mod_done(void) {
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return g_exp_mod_done;
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}
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uint32_t exp_mod_done_handler(void) {
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set_exp_mod_done(1);
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se_trigger_interrupt();
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint8_t modulus[0x100];
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uint8_t exponent[0x100];
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uint8_t input[0x100];
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upage_ref_t page_ref;
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/* Validate size. */
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if (args->X[4] == 0 || args->X[4] > 0x100 || (args->X[4] & 3) != 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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size_t exponent_size = (size_t)args->X[4];
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void *user_input = (void *)args->X[1];
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void *user_exponent = (void *)args->X[2];
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void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[3];
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/* Copy user data into secure memory. */
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if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_input) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, input, user_input, 0x100) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, exponent, user_exponent, exponent_size) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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set_exp_mod_done(0);
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/* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */
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set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, exponent, exponent_size);
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se_exp_mod(0, input, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler);
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_get_random_bytes(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint8_t random_bytes[0x40];
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if (args->X[1] > 0x38) {
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return 2;
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}
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size_t size = (size_t)args->X[1];
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flush_dcache_range(random_bytes, random_bytes + size);
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se_generate_random(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_RNGKEY, random_bytes, size);
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flush_dcache_range(random_bytes, random_bytes + size);
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memcpy(&args->X[1], random_bytes, size);
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_generate_aes_kek(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint64_t wrapped_kek[2];
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uint8_t kek_source[0x10];
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uint64_t kek[2];
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uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
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wrapped_kek[0] = args->X[1];
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wrapped_kek[1] = args->X[2];
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unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[3];
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if (master_key_rev > 0) {
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master_key_rev -= 1; /* GenerateAesKek offsets by one. */
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}
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if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
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return 2;
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}
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uint64_t packed_options = args->X[4];
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if (packed_options > 0xFF) {
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return 2;
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}
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/* Switched the output based on how the system was booted. */
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uint8_t mask_id = (uint8_t)((packed_options >> 1) & 3);
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/* Switches the output based on how it will be used. */
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uint8_t usecase = (uint8_t)((packed_options >> 5) & 3);
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/* Switched the output based on whether it should be console unique. */
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int is_personalized = (int)(packed_options & 1);
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uint64_t is_recovery_boot = configitem_is_recovery_boot();
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/* Mask 2 is only allowed when booted from recovery. */
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if (mask_id == 2 && is_recovery_boot == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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/* Mask 1 is only allowed when booted normally. */
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if (mask_id == 1 && is_recovery_boot != 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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/* Masks 0, 3 are allowed all the time. */
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const uint8_t kek_seeds[4][0x10] = {
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{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00},
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{0xA2, 0xAB, 0xBF, 0x9C, 0x92, 0x2F, 0xBB, 0xE3, 0x78, 0x79, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xA5, 0x74},
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{0x57, 0xE2, 0xD9, 0x45, 0xE4, 0x92, 0xF4, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xF9, 0x86, 0x38, 0x89, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x3C},
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{0xE5, 0x4D, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xF0, 0x4F, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0xAD, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x32, 0x95, 0x59, 0xBB}
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};
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const uint8_t kek_masks[4][0x10] = {
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{0x4D, 0x87, 0x09, 0x86, 0xC4, 0x5D, 0x20, 0x72, 0x2F, 0xBA, 0x10, 0x53, 0xDA, 0x92, 0xE8, 0xA9},
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{0x25, 0x03, 0x31, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x26, 0x0B, 0x79, 0x8C, 0x80, 0xD2, 0x69, 0x98, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x77},
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{0x76, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x34, 0x93, 0x2D, 0xE1, 0x84, 0x24, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x65, 0x55, 0x04, 0x65, 0x81},
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{0xAF, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0x08, 0xA2, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x46, 0xC9, 0x0B}
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};
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/* Create kek source. */
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) {
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kek_source[i] = kek_seeds[usecase][i] ^ kek_masks[mask_id][i];
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}
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unsigned int keyslot;
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if (is_personalized) {
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/* Behavior changed in 4.0.0. */
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if (mkey_get_revision() >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_CURRENT) {
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if (master_key_rev >= 1) {
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keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY; /* New device key, 4.x. */
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} else {
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keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY; /* Old device key, 4.x. */
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}
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} else {
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keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY;
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}
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} else {
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keyslot = mkey_get_keyslot(master_key_rev);
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}
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/* Derive kek. */
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decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, kek_source, 0x10);
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se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, kek, 0x10, wrapped_kek, 0x10);
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/* Seal kek. */
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seal_key(sealed_kek, 0x10, kek, 0x10, usecase);
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args->X[1] = sealed_kek[0];
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args->X[2] = sealed_kek[1];
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_load_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
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uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
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uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1];
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if (keyslot > 3) {
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return 2;
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}
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/* Copy keydata */
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sealed_kek[0] = args->X[2];
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sealed_kek[1] = args->X[3];
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wrapped_key[0] = args->X[4];
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wrapped_key[1] = args->X[5];
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/* TODO: Unseal the kek. */
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unseal_key(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, sealed_kek, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_AES);
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/* Unwrap the key. */
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decrypt_data_into_keyslot(keyslot, KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, wrapped_key, 0x10);
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return 0;
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}
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void set_crypt_aes_done(int done) {
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g_crypt_aes_done = done & 1;
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}
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int get_crypt_aes_done(void) {
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return g_crypt_aes_done;
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}
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uint32_t crypt_aes_done_handler(void) {
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se_check_for_error();
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set_crypt_aes_done(1);
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se_trigger_interrupt();
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_crypt_aes(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint32_t keyslot = args->X[1] & 3;
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uint32_t mode = (args->X[1] >> 4) & 3;
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uint64_t iv_ctr[2];
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iv_ctr[0] = args->X[2];
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iv_ctr[1] = args->X[3];
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uint32_t in_ll_paddr = (uint32_t)(args->X[4]);
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uint32_t out_ll_paddr = (uint32_t)(args->X[5]);
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size_t size = args->X[6];
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if (size & 0xF) {
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panic();
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}
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set_crypt_aes_done(0);
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uint64_t result = 0;
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switch (mode) {
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case 0: /* CBC Encryption */
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se_aes_cbc_encrypt_insecure(keyslot, out_ll_paddr, in_ll_paddr, size, iv_ctr, crypt_aes_done_handler);
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result = 0;
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break;
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case 1: /* CBC Decryption */
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se_aes_cbc_decrypt_insecure(keyslot, out_ll_paddr, in_ll_paddr, size, iv_ctr, crypt_aes_done_handler);
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result = 0;
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break;
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case 2: /* CTR "Encryption" */
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se_aes_ctr_crypt_insecure(keyslot, out_ll_paddr, in_ll_paddr, size, iv_ctr, crypt_aes_done_handler);
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result = 0;
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break;
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case 3:
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default:
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result = 1;
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break;
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}
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return result;
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}
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uint32_t user_generate_specific_aes_key(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
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uint8_t key[0x10];
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unsigned int master_key_rev;
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int should_mask;
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wrapped_key[0] = args->X[1];
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wrapped_key[1] = args->X[2];
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if (args->X[4] > MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
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return 2;
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}
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master_key_rev = (unsigned int)(args->X[4]);
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if (args->X[3] > 1) {
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return 2;
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}
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should_mask = (int)(args->X[3]);
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unsigned int keyslot;
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/* Behavior changed in 4.0.0. */
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if (mkey_get_revision() >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_400_CURRENT) {
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if (master_key_rev >= 2) {
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keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY; /* New device key, 4.x. */
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} else {
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keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_4XOLDDEVICEKEY; /* Old device key, 4.x. */
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}
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} else {
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keyslot = KEYSLOT_SWITCH_DEVICEKEY;
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}
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if (0 /* TODO: GET_BOOTROM_PATCH_VERSION < 0x7F */) {
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/* On dev units, use a fixed "all-zeroes" seed. */
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/* Yes, this data really is all-zero in actual TrustZone .rodata. */
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uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
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uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_ctr[0x10] = {0x3C, 0xD5, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x68, 0x31, 0x4A, 0x06, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x0C, 0xD9, 0xF6, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0xE9};
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uint8_t dev_specific_aes_key_mask[0x10] = {0xAC, 0xCA, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0xFF, 0x2E, 0xB9, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x21, 0x1E};
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cache_flush(key, key + 0x10);
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se_aes_ctr_crypt(keyslot, key, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10, dev_specific_aes_key_ctr, 0x10);
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cache_flush(key, key + 0x10);
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if (should_mask) {
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for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 0x10; i++) {
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key[i] ^= dev_specific_aes_key_mask[i];
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}
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}
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} else {
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/* On retail, standard kek->key decryption. */
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uint8_t retail_specific_aes_key_source[0x10] = {0xE2, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0x7A, 0x11, 0x9C, 0xB8, 0x80, 0xE8, 0x22, 0x88, 0x8A, 0x46, 0xFB, 0xA1, 0x95};
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decrypt_data_into_keyslot(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, keyslot, retail_specific_aes_key_source, 0x10);
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se_aes_ecb_decrypt_block(KEYSLOT_SWITCH_TEMPKEY, key, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10);
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}
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args->X[1] = key[0];
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args->X[2] = key[1];
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_compute_cmac(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1];
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void *user_address = (void *)args->X[2];
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size_t size = (size_t)args->X[3];
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uint8_t user_data[0x400];
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uint64_t result_cmac[2];
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upage_ref_t page_ref;
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/* Validate keyslot and size. */
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if (keyslot > 3 || args->X[3] > 0x400) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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flush_dcache_range(user_data, user_data + size);
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se_compute_aes_128_cmac(keyslot, result_cmac, 0x10, user_data, size);
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/* Copy CMAC out. */
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args->X[1] = result_cmac[0];
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args->X[2] = result_cmac[1];
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_load_rsa_oaep_key(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
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uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
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int is_personalized;
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uint8_t user_data[0x400];
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void *user_address;
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size_t size;
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upage_ref_t page_ref;
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/* Copy keydata */
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sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1];
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sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2];
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if (args->X[3] > 1) {
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return 2;
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}
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is_personalized = (int)args->X[3];
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user_address = (void *)args->X[4];
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size = (size_t)args->X[5];
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wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6];
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wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7];
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if (is_personalized && size != 0x240) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (!is_personalized && (size != 0x220 /* TODO: || GET_BOOTROM_PATCH_VERSION >= 0x7F */)) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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/* Ensure that our private key is 0x100 bytes. */
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if (gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_RSAOAEP, is_personalized) < 0x100) {
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return 2;
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}
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memcpy(g_rsa_oaep_exponent, user_data, 0x100);
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t user_decrypt_rsa_private_key(smc_args_t *args) {
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uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
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uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
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int is_personalized;
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uint8_t user_data[0x400];
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void *user_address;
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size_t size;
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upage_ref_t page_ref;
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/* Copy keydata */
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sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1];
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sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2];
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if (args->X[3] > 1) {
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return 2;
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}
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is_personalized = (int)args->X[3];
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user_address = (void *)args->X[4];
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size = (size_t)args->X[5];
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wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6];
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wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7];
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if (size > 0x240) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (is_personalized && size < 0x31) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (!is_personalized && (size < 0x11 /* TODO: || GET_BOOTROM_PATCH_VERSION >= 0x7F */)) {
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return 2;
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}
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if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
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return 2;
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}
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size_t out_size;
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if ((out_size = gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_RSAPRIVATE, is_personalized)) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (secure_copy_to_user(&page_ref, user_address, user_data, size) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
args->X[1] = out_size;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t user_load_secure_exp_mod_key(smc_args_t *args) {
|
|
uint64_t sealed_kek[2];
|
|
uint64_t wrapped_key[2];
|
|
int is_personalized;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t user_data[0x400];
|
|
void *user_address;
|
|
size_t size;
|
|
upage_ref_t page_ref;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy keydata */
|
|
sealed_kek[0] = args->X[1];
|
|
sealed_kek[1] = args->X[2];
|
|
if (args->X[3] > 1) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
is_personalized = (int)args->X[3];
|
|
user_address = (void *)args->X[4];
|
|
size = (size_t)args->X[5];
|
|
wrapped_key[0] = args->X[6];
|
|
wrapped_key[1] = args->X[7];
|
|
|
|
if (is_personalized && size != 0x130) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!is_personalized && (size != 0x110 /* TODO: || GET_BOOTROM_PATCH_VERSION >= 0x7F */)) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_address) == 0 || user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, user_data, user_address, size) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t out_size;
|
|
|
|
/* Ensure that our key is non-zero bytes. */
|
|
if ((out_size = gcm_decrypt_key(user_data, size, user_data, size, sealed_kek, 0x10, wrapped_key, 0x10, CRYPTOUSECASE_SECUREEXPMOD, is_personalized)) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy key to global. */
|
|
if (out_size <= 0x100) {
|
|
memcpy(g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, user_data, out_size);
|
|
} else {
|
|
memcpy(g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, user_data, 0x100);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t user_secure_exp_mod(smc_args_t *args) {
|
|
uint8_t modulus[0x100];
|
|
uint8_t input[0x100];
|
|
|
|
upage_ref_t page_ref;
|
|
|
|
void *user_input = (void *)args->X[1];
|
|
void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[2];
|
|
|
|
/* Copy user data into secure memory. */
|
|
if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_input) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, input, user_input, 0x100) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set_exp_mod_done(0);
|
|
/* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */
|
|
set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, g_secure_exp_mod_exponent, 0x100);
|
|
se_exp_mod(0, input, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t user_unwrap_rsa_oaep_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
|
|
uint8_t modulus[0x100];
|
|
uint8_t wrapped_key[0x100];
|
|
|
|
upage_ref_t page_ref;
|
|
|
|
void *user_wrapped_key = (void *)args->X[1];
|
|
void *user_modulus = (void *)args->X[2];
|
|
unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[7];
|
|
|
|
if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy user data into secure memory. */
|
|
if (upage_init(&page_ref, user_wrapped_key) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, wrapped_key, user_wrapped_key, 0x100) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
if (user_copy_to_secure(&page_ref, modulus, user_modulus, 0x100) == 0) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set_exp_mod_done(0);
|
|
|
|
/* Expected label_hash occupies args->X[3] to args->X[6]. */
|
|
tkey_set_expected_label_hash(&args->X[3]);
|
|
|
|
tkey_set_master_key_rev(master_key_rev);
|
|
|
|
/* Hardcode RSA keyslot 0. */
|
|
set_rsa_keyslot(0, modulus, 0x100, g_rsa_oaep_exponent, 0x100);
|
|
se_exp_mod(0, wrapped_key, 0x100, exp_mod_done_handler);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t user_load_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
|
|
uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2];
|
|
|
|
uint32_t keyslot = (uint32_t)args->X[1];
|
|
if (keyslot > 3) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy keydata */
|
|
sealed_titlekey[0] = args->X[2];
|
|
sealed_titlekey[1] = args->X[3];
|
|
|
|
/* Unseal the key. */
|
|
unseal_titlekey(keyslot, sealed_titlekey, 0x10);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint32_t user_unwrap_aes_wrapped_titlekey(smc_args_t *args) {
|
|
uint64_t aes_wrapped_titlekey[2];
|
|
uint8_t titlekey[0x10];
|
|
uint64_t sealed_titlekey[2];
|
|
|
|
aes_wrapped_titlekey[0] = args->X[1];
|
|
aes_wrapped_titlekey[1] = args->X[2];
|
|
unsigned int master_key_rev = (unsigned int)args->X[3];
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (master_key_rev >= MASTERKEY_REVISION_MAX) {
|
|
return 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tkey_set_master_key_rev(master_key_rev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
tkey_aes_unwrap(titlekey, 0x10, aes_wrapped_titlekey, 0x10);
|
|
seal_titlekey(sealed_titlekey, 0x10, titlekey, 0x10);
|
|
|
|
args->X[1] = sealed_titlekey[0];
|
|
args->X[2] = sealed_titlekey[1];
|
|
}
|