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v1.8.1: Fixes for new console key derivation

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This commit is contained in:
shchmue 2019-12-30 09:18:02 -07:00
parent a55e62d45a
commit e72e486283
2 changed files with 50 additions and 19 deletions
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2
Makefile
View file

@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ include $(DEVKITARM)/base_rules
IPL_LOAD_ADDR := 0x40003000
LPVERSION_MAJOR := 1
LPVERSION_MINOR := 8
LPVERSION_BUGFX := 0
LPVERSION_BUGFX := 1
################################################################################

67
source/keys/keys.c
View file

@ -76,11 +76,19 @@ u32 start_time, end_time;
#define SAVE_KEY(name, src, len) _save_key(name, src, len, text_buffer)
#define SAVE_KEY_FAMILY(name, src, start, count, len) _save_key_family(name, src, start, count, len, text_buffer)
static inline u32 _read_le_u32(const void *buffer, u32 offset) {
return (*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 0) ) |
(*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 1) << 0x08) |
(*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 2) << 0x10) |
(*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 3) << 0x18);
}
// key functions
static bool _key_exists(const void *data) { return memcmp(data, zeros, 0x10); };
static void _save_key(const char *name, const void *data, u32 len, char *outbuf);
static void _save_key_family(const char *name, const void *data, u32 start_key, u32 num_keys, u32 len, char *outbuf);
static void _generate_kek(u32 ks, const void *key_source, void *master_key, const void *kek_seed, const void *key_seed);
static void _get_device_key(u32 ks, void *out_device_key, u32 revision, const void *device_key, const void *master_key);
// nca functions
static void *_nca_process(u32 hk_ks1, u32 hk_ks2, FIL *fp, u32 key_offset, u32 len, const u8 key_area_key[3][KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX+1][0x10]);
static u32 _nca_fread_ctr(u32 ks, FIL *fp, void *buffer, u32 offset, u32 len, u8 *ctr);
@ -93,7 +101,7 @@ void dump_keys() {
u8 temp_key[0x10],
bis_key[4][0x20] = {0},
device_key[0x10] = {0},
new_device_key[0x10] = {0},
device_key_4x[0x10] = {0},
sd_seed[0x10] = {0},
// FS-related keys
fs_keys[13][0x20] = {0},
@ -102,6 +110,7 @@ void dump_keys() {
// other sysmodule sources
es_keys[3][0x10] = {0},
eticket_rsa_kek[0x10] = {0},
eticket_rsa_kek_personalized[0x10] = {0},
ssl_keys[0x10] = {0},
ssl_rsa_kek[0x10] = {0},
// keyblob-derived families
@ -202,7 +211,7 @@ void dump_keys() {
}
}
// write self to payload.bin to run again when sept finishes
u32 payload_size = *(u32 *)(IPL_LOAD_ADDR + 0x84) - IPL_LOAD_ADDR;
u32 payload_size = _read_le_u32((u8 *)IPL_LOAD_ADDR, 0x84) - IPL_LOAD_ADDR;
if (f_open(&fp, "sd:/sept/payload.bin", FA_CREATE_NEW | FA_WRITE)) {
EPRINTF("Unable to open /sept/payload.bin to write.");
goto out_wait;
@ -314,7 +323,7 @@ get_tsec: ;
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(7, 0, keyblob_mac_key[i], keyblob_mac_key_source); // kbm = unwrap(kbms, kbk)
if (i == 0) {
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(7, 0, device_key, per_console_key_source); // devkey = unwrap(pcks, kbk0)
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(7, 0, new_device_key, per_console_key_source_4x);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(7, 0, device_key_4x, per_console_key_source_4x);
}
// verify keyblob is not corrupt
@ -355,11 +364,7 @@ get_tsec: ;
}
if (_key_exists(device_key)) {
if (key_generation) {
se_aes_key_set(8, new_device_key, 0x10);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(8, 0, temp_key, new_device_key_sources[key_generation - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400]);
se_aes_key_set(8, master_key[0], 0x10);
se_aes_unwrap_key(8, 8, new_device_keygen_sources[key_generation - KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400]);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(8, 0, temp_key, temp_key);
_get_device_key(8, temp_key, key_generation, device_key_4x, master_key[0]);
} else
memcpy(temp_key, device_key, 0x10);
se_aes_key_set(8, temp_key, 0x10);
@ -585,7 +590,7 @@ pkg2_done:
}
se_aes_xts_crypt(5, 4, 0, 1, dec_header + 0x200, dec_header, 32, 1);
// es doesn't contain es key sources on 1.0.0
if (memcmp(pkg1_id->id, "2016", 4) && *(u32*)(dec_header + 0x210) == 0x33 && dec_header[0x205] == 0) {
if (memcmp(pkg1_id->id, "2016", 4) && _read_le_u32(dec_header, 0x210) == 0x33 && dec_header[0x205] == 0) {
u8 hash_order[3] = {0, 1, 2};
if (pkg1_id->kb >= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_500) {
hash_order[0] = 1;
@ -609,7 +614,7 @@ pkg2_done:
free(temp_file);
temp_file = NULL;
titles_found++;
} else if (*(u32*)(dec_header + 0x210) == 0x24 && dec_header[0x205] == 0) {
} else if (_read_le_u32(dec_header, 0x210) == 0x24 && dec_header[0x205] == 0) {
temp_file = (u8*)_nca_process(5, 4, &fp, pkg1_id->key_info.ssl_offset, 0x70, key_area_key);
for (u32 i = 0; i <= 0x60; i++) {
se_calc_sha256(temp_hash, temp_file + i, 0x10);
@ -720,13 +725,31 @@ get_titlekeys:
se_aes_key_set(8, bis_key[2] + 0x00, 0x10);
se_aes_key_set(9, bis_key[2] + 0x10, 0x10);
if (*(u32 *)buffer != 0x304C4143) {
if (_read_le_u32(buffer, 0) != 0x304C4143) {
EPRINTF("CAL0 magic not found. Check BIS key 0.");
free(buffer);
goto dismount;
}
se_aes_key_set(2, eticket_rsa_kek, 0x10);
u32 cal_version = _read_le_u32(buffer, 4);
u32 keypair_generation = _read_le_u32(buffer, 0x3AD0);
if (cal_version <= 8)
keypair_generation = 0; // settings zeroes this out below cal version 9
if (keypair_generation) {
keypair_generation--;
for (u32 i = 0; i < 0x10; i++)
temp_key[i] = aes_kek_generation_source[i] ^ aes_kek_seed_03[i];
u8 temp_device_key[0x10] = {0};
_get_device_key(7, temp_device_key, keypair_generation, device_key_4x, master_key[0]);
_generate_kek(7, es_keys[1], temp_device_key, temp_key, NULL);
se_aes_crypt_block_ecb(7, 0, eticket_rsa_kek_personalized, es_keys[0]);
memcpy(temp_key, eticket_rsa_kek_personalized, 0x10);
} else {
memcpy(temp_key, eticket_rsa_kek, 0x10);
}
se_aes_key_set(2, temp_key, 0x10);
se_aes_crypt_ctr(2, keypair, 0x230, buffer + 0x38a0, 0x230, buffer + 0x3890);
u8 *D = keypair, *N = keypair + 0x100, *E = keypair + 0x200;
@ -916,7 +939,7 @@ key_output: ;
EPRINTF("Unable to mount SD.");
goto free_buffers;
}
u32 text_buffer_size = _titlekey_count * 68 < 0x3000 ? 0x3000 : _titlekey_count * 68 + 1;
u32 text_buffer_size = _titlekey_count * 68 < 0x4000 ? 0x4000 : _titlekey_count * 68 + 1;
text_buffer = (char *)calloc(1, text_buffer_size);
SAVE_KEY("aes_kek_generation_source", aes_kek_generation_source, 0x10);
@ -925,7 +948,9 @@ key_output: ;
SAVE_KEY_FAMILY("bis_key", bis_key, 0, 4, 0x20);
SAVE_KEY_FAMILY("bis_key_source", bis_key_source, 0, 3, 0x20);
SAVE_KEY("device_key", device_key, 0x10);
SAVE_KEY("device_key_4x", device_key_4x, 0x10);
SAVE_KEY("eticket_rsa_kek", eticket_rsa_kek, 0x10);
SAVE_KEY("eticket_rsa_kek_personalized", eticket_rsa_kek_personalized, 0x10);
SAVE_KEY("eticket_rsa_kek_source", es_keys[0], 0x10);
SAVE_KEY("eticket_rsa_kekek_source", es_keys[1], 0x10);
SAVE_KEY("header_kek_source", fs_keys[0], 0x10);
@ -1054,11 +1079,17 @@ static void _generate_kek(u32 ks, const void *key_source, void *master_key, cons
se_aes_unwrap_key(ks, ks, key_seed);
}
static inline u32 _read_le_u32(const void *buffer, u32 offset) {
return (*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 0) ) |
(*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 1) << 0x08) |
(*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 2) << 0x10) |
(*(u8*)(buffer + offset + 3) << 0x18);
static void _get_device_key(u32 ks, void *out_device_key, u32 revision, const void *device_key, const void *master_key) {
if (revision < KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400)
memcpy(out_device_key, device_key, 0x10);
revision -= KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_400;
u8 temp_key[0x10] = {0};
se_aes_key_set(ks, device_key, 0x10);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(ks, 0, temp_key, 0x10, new_device_key_sources[revision], 0x10);
se_aes_key_set(ks, master_key, 0x10);
se_aes_unwrap_key(ks, ks, new_device_keygen_sources[revision]);
se_aes_crypt_ecb(ks, 0, out_device_key, 0x10, temp_key, 0x10);
}
static void *_nca_process(u32 hk_ks1, u32 hk_ks2, FIL *fp, u32 key_offset, u32 len, const u8 key_area_key[3][KB_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAX+1][0x10]) {