mirror of
https://github.com/DarkMatterCore/nxdumptool.git
synced 2024-11-10 04:31:44 +00:00
f82d7a3db4
* Rewrote mutex handling throughout the code to use a small, macro-based scoped lock implementation. * Removed extern variables from common.h - launch path management is now completely handled in utils.c. * Updated NpdmSystemCallId_Count to reflect changes introduced in 12.0.0. * Added NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration enum. * NCA main signature moduli are now retrieved from FS .rodata at runtime. * Simplified lock management in usb.c by using a single global mutex with scoped locks instead of three different r/w locks. * Updated FatFs to R0.14b. * Enabled 64-bit LBA support in FatFs to potentially support custom eMMC replacements / resized USER partitions in the future. * Updated LZ4 to v1.9.3. * Fixed typos. * USB gamecard dumper PoC now only dumps the Initial Data area. * Updated to-do list.
921 lines
32 KiB
C
921 lines
32 KiB
C
/*
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* keys.c
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2018-2020, SciresM.
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* Copyright (c) 2019, shchmue.
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* Copyright (c) 2020-2021, DarkMatterCore <pabloacurielz@gmail.com>.
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*
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* This file is part of nxdumptool (https://github.com/DarkMatterCore/nxdumptool).
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*
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* nxdumptool is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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* nxdumptool is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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*
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
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*/
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#include "nxdt_utils.h"
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#include "keys.h"
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#include "mem.h"
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#include "nca.h"
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#include "rsa.h"
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#define KEYS_FILE_PATH "sdmc:/switch/prod.keys" /* Location used by Lockpick_RCM. */
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#define ETICKET_RSA_DEVICE_KEY_PUBLIC_EXPONENT 0x10001
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/* Type definitions. */
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typedef bool (*KeysIsKeyMandatoryFunction)(void); /* Used to determine if a key is mandatory or not at runtime. */
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typedef struct {
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char name[64];
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u8 hash[SHA256_HASH_SIZE];
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u64 size;
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void *dst;
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KeysIsKeyMandatoryFunction mandatory_func; ///< If NULL, key is mandatory.
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} KeysMemoryKey;
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typedef struct {
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MemoryLocation location;
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u32 key_count;
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KeysMemoryKey keys[];
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} KeysMemoryInfo;
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typedef struct {
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///< AES-128-XTS key needed to handle NCA header crypto.
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u8 nca_header_kek_source[AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< Retrieved from the .rodata segment in the FS sysmodule.
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u8 nca_header_key_source[AES_128_KEY_SIZE * 2]; ///< Retrieved from the .data segment in the FS sysmodule.
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u8 nca_header_kek_sealed[AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< Generated from nca_header_kek_source. Sealed by the SMC AES engine.
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u8 nca_header_key[AES_128_KEY_SIZE * 2]; ///< Generated from nca_header_kek_sealed and nca_header_key_source.
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///< RSA-2048-PSS moduli used to verify the main signature from NCA headers.
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u8 nca_main_signature_moduli_prod[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_Max][RSA2048_PUBKEY_SIZE]; ///< Moduli used in retail units. Retrieved from the .rodata segment in the FS sysmodule.
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u8 nca_main_signature_moduli_dev[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_Max][RSA2048_PUBKEY_SIZE]; ///< Moduli used in development units. Retrieved from the .rodata segment in the FS sysmodule.
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///< AES-128-ECB keys needed to handle key area crypto from NCA headers.
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u8 nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Count][AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< Retrieved from the .rodata segment in the FS sysmodule.
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u8 nca_kaek_sealed[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Count][NcaKeyGeneration_Max][AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< Generated from nca_kaek_sources. Sealed by the SMC AES engine.
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u8 nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Count][NcaKeyGeneration_Max][AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< Unsealed key area encryption keys. Retrieved from the Lockpick_RCM keys file.
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///< AES-128-CTR key needed to decrypt the console-specific eTicket RSA device key stored in PRODINFO.
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u8 eticket_rsa_kek[AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< eTicket RSA key encryption key (generic). Retrieved from the Lockpick_RCM keys file.
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u8 eticket_rsa_kek_personalized[AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< eTicket RSA key encryption key (console-specific). Retrieved from the Lockpick_RCM keys file.
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///< AES-128-ECB keys needed to decrypt titlekeys.
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u8 ticket_common_keys[NcaKeyGeneration_Max][AES_128_KEY_SIZE]; ///< Retrieved from the Lockpick_RCM keys file.
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} KeysNcaKeyset;
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/// Used to parse the eTicket RSA device key retrieved from PRODINFO via setcalGetEticketDeviceKey().
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/// Everything after the AES CTR is encrypted using the eTicket RSA device key encryption key.
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typedef struct {
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u8 ctr[0x10];
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u8 exponent[0x100];
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u8 modulus[0x100];
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u32 public_exponent; ///< Must match ETICKET_RSA_DEVICE_KEY_PUBLIC_EXPONENT. Stored using big endian byte order.
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u8 padding[0x14];
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u64 device_id;
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u8 ghash[0x10];
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} EticketRsaDeviceKey;
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NXDT_ASSERT(EticketRsaDeviceKey, 0x240);
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/* Function prototypes. */
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static bool keysIsProductionModulus1xMandatory(void);
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static bool keysIsProductionModulus9xMandatory(void);
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static bool keysIsDevelopmentModulus1xMandatory(void);
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static bool keysIsDevelopmentModulus9xMandatory(void);
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static bool keysRetrieveKeysFromProgramMemory(KeysMemoryInfo *info);
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static bool keysDeriveNcaHeaderKey(void);
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static bool keysDeriveSealedNcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeys(void);
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static int keysGetKeyAndValueFromFile(FILE *f, char **key, char **value);
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static char keysConvertHexCharToBinary(char c);
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static bool keysParseHexKey(u8 *out, const char *key, const char *value, u32 size);
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static bool keysReadKeysFromFile(void);
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static bool keysGetDecryptedEticketRsaDeviceKey(void);
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static bool keysTestEticketRsaDeviceKey(const void *e, const void *d, const void *n);
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/* Global variables. */
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static KeysNcaKeyset g_ncaKeyset = {0};
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static bool g_ncaKeysetLoaded = false;
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static Mutex g_ncaKeysetMutex = 0;
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static SetCalRsa2048DeviceKey g_eTicketRsaDeviceKey = {0};
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/// Used during the RSA-OAEP titlekey decryption steps.
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static const u8 g_nullHash[0x20] = {
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0xE3, 0xB0, 0xC4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xFC, 0x1C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0xFB, 0xF4, 0xC8, 0x99, 0x6F, 0xB9, 0x24,
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0x27, 0xAE, 0x41, 0xE4, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xA4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x78, 0x52, 0xB8, 0x55
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};
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static KeysMemoryInfo g_fsRodataMemoryInfo = {
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.location = {
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.program_id = FS_SYSMODULE_TID,
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.mask = MemoryProgramSegmentType_Rodata,
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.data = NULL,
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.data_size = 0
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},
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.key_count = 8,
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.keys = {
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{
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.name = "nca_header_kek_source",
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.hash = {
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0x18, 0x88, 0xCA, 0xED, 0x55, 0x51, 0xB3, 0xED, 0xE0, 0x14, 0x99, 0xE8, 0x7C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x68,
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0x27, 0xF8, 0x08, 0x20, 0xEF, 0xB2, 0x75, 0x92, 0x10, 0x55, 0xAA, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0xFF, 0xC2
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_kek_source),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_kek_source,
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.mandatory_func = NULL
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_main_signature_modulus_prod_00",
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.hash = {
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0xF9, 0x2E, 0x84, 0x98, 0x17, 0x2C, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0x20, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0xF7, 0xD3, 0xE7, 0x2C, 0x62,
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0x50, 0xA9, 0x40, 0x7A, 0xE7, 0x84, 0xE0, 0x03, 0x58, 0x07, 0x85, 0xA5, 0x68, 0x0B, 0x80, 0x33
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_prod[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_100_811]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_prod[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_100_811],
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.mandatory_func = &keysIsProductionModulus1xMandatory
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_main_signature_modulus_prod_01",
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.hash = {
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0x5F, 0x6B, 0xE3, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x6E, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x1C, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0xA1, 0x70, 0x6A, 0x9D, 0x58,
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0x04, 0xEB, 0x90, 0x53, 0x72, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x93, 0xF2, 0xAF, 0x9E, 0x8A, 0xD1, 0xFA
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_prod[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_900_1202]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_prod[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_900_1202],
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.mandatory_func = &keysIsProductionModulus9xMandatory
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_main_signature_modulus_dev_00",
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.hash = {
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0x50, 0xF8, 0x26, 0xBB, 0x13, 0xFE, 0xB2, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xCF, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0x38, 0x45, 0xC3, 0x51,
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0x4D, 0xCB, 0x06, 0x91, 0x83, 0x52, 0x06, 0x35, 0x7A, 0xC1, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xF1, 0x60, 0x9F, 0x18
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_dev[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_100_811]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_dev[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_100_811],
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.mandatory_func = &keysIsDevelopmentModulus1xMandatory
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_main_signature_modulus_dev_01",
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.hash = {
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0x56, 0xF5, 0x06, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x65, 0x45, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x60, 0x01, 0x11,
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0xBC, 0xC7, 0x38, 0x56, 0x99, 0x16, 0xAD, 0xA5, 0xDD, 0x89, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xAB, 0x28, 0x5B, 0x18
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_dev[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_900_1202]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_main_signature_moduli_dev[NcaMainSignatureKeyGeneration_900_1202],
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.mandatory_func = &keysIsDevelopmentModulus9xMandatory
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_kaek_application_source",
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.hash = {
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0x04, 0xAD, 0x66, 0x14, 0x3C, 0x72, 0x6B, 0x2A, 0x13, 0x9F, 0xB6, 0xB2, 0x11, 0x28, 0xB4, 0x6F,
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0x56, 0xC5, 0x53, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x88, 0x71, 0x10, 0x30, 0x42, 0x98, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0x09, 0x2D, 0x9E
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Application]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Application],
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.mandatory_func = NULL
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_kaek_ocean_source",
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.hash = {
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0xFD, 0x43, 0x40, 0x00, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x2B, 0x26, 0xF8, 0xE9, 0xA9, 0xD2, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x2F, 0x6B,
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0xE5, 0x77, 0x3C, 0xBB, 0x9D, 0xC8, 0x63, 0x00, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x99, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0x33, 0xA4, 0x17
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Ocean]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Ocean],
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.mandatory_func = NULL
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},
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{
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.name = "nca_kaek_system_source",
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.hash = {
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0x1F, 0x17, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0x51, 0xAD, 0x1C, 0x23, 0x79, 0xB5, 0x8F, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xA4, 0x91, 0x2E,
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0xC2, 0x10, 0x64, 0x41, 0xE5, 0x17, 0x22, 0xF3, 0x87, 0x00, 0xD5, 0x93, 0x7A, 0x11, 0x62, 0xF7
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_System]),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_System],
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.mandatory_func = NULL
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}
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}
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};
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static KeysMemoryInfo g_fsDataMemoryInfo = {
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.location = {
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.program_id = FS_SYSMODULE_TID,
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.mask = MemoryProgramSegmentType_Data,
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.data = NULL,
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.data_size = 0
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},
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.key_count = 1,
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.keys = {
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{
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.name = "nca_header_key_source",
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.hash = {
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0x8F, 0x78, 0x3E, 0x46, 0x85, 0x2D, 0xF6, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0xA4, 0xE1, 0x92, 0x73, 0xC4, 0xAD, 0xBA,
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0xEE, 0x16, 0x38, 0x00, 0x43, 0xE1, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x18, 0xC4, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0xA6
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},
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.size = sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key_source),
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.dst = g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key_source,
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.mandatory_func = NULL
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}
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}
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};
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bool keysLoadNcaKeyset(void)
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{
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bool ret = false;
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SCOPED_LOCK(&g_ncaKeysetMutex)
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{
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ret = g_ncaKeysetLoaded;
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if (ret) break;
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/* Retrieve FS .rodata keys. */
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if (!keysRetrieveKeysFromProgramMemory(&g_fsRodataMemoryInfo))
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{
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LOG_MSG("Unable to retrieve keys from FS .rodata segment!");
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break;
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}
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/* Retrieve FS .data keys. */
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if (!keysRetrieveKeysFromProgramMemory(&g_fsDataMemoryInfo))
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{
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LOG_MSG("Unable to retrieve keys from FS .data segment!");
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break;
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}
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/* Derive NCA header key. */
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if (!keysDeriveNcaHeaderKey())
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{
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LOG_MSG("Unable to derive NCA header key!");
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break;
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}
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/* Derive sealed NCA KAEKs. */
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if (!keysDeriveSealedNcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeys())
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{
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LOG_MSG("Unable to derive sealed NCA KAEKs!");
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break;
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}
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/* Read additional keys from the keys file. */
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if (!keysReadKeysFromFile()) break;
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/* Get decrypted eTicket RSA device key. */
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if (!keysGetDecryptedEticketRsaDeviceKey()) break;
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/* Update flags. */
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ret = g_ncaKeysetLoaded = true;
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}
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/*if (ret)
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{
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LOG_DATA(&g_ncaKeyset, sizeof(KeysNcaKeyset), "NCA keyset dump:");
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LOG_DATA(&g_eTicketRsaDeviceKey, sizeof(SetCalRsa2048DeviceKey), "eTicket RSA device key dump:");
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}*/
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return ret;
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}
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const u8 *keysGetNcaHeaderKey(void)
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{
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const u8 *ret = NULL;
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SCOPED_LOCK(&g_ncaKeysetMutex)
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{
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if (g_ncaKeysetLoaded) ret = (const u8*)(g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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bool keysDecryptNcaKeyAreaEntry(u8 kaek_index, u8 key_generation, void *dst, const void *src)
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{
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bool ret = false;
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u8 key_gen_val = (key_generation ? (key_generation - 1) : key_generation);
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if (kaek_index >= NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Count)
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{
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LOG_MSG("Invalid KAEK index! (0x%02X).", kaek_index);
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goto end;
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}
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if (key_gen_val >= NcaKeyGeneration_Max)
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{
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LOG_MSG("Invalid key generation value! (0x%02X).", key_gen_val);
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goto end;
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}
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if (!dst || !src)
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{
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LOG_MSG("Invalid destination/source pointer.");
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goto end;
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}
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SCOPED_LOCK(&g_ncaKeysetMutex)
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{
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if (!g_ncaKeysetLoaded) break;
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Result rc = splCryptoGenerateAesKey(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sealed[kaek_index][key_gen_val], src, dst);
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if (!(ret = R_SUCCEEDED(rc))) LOG_MSG("splCryptoGenerateAesKey failed! (0x%08X).", rc);
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}
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end:
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return ret;
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}
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const u8 *keysGetNcaKeyAreaEncryptionKey(u8 kaek_index, u8 key_generation)
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{
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const u8 *ret = NULL;
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u8 key_gen_val = (key_generation ? (key_generation - 1) : key_generation);
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if (kaek_index >= NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Count)
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{
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LOG_MSG("Invalid KAEK index! (0x%02X).", kaek_index);
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goto end;
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}
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if (key_gen_val >= NcaKeyGeneration_Max)
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{
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LOG_MSG("Invalid key generation value! (0x%02X).", key_gen_val);
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goto end;
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}
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SCOPED_LOCK(&g_ncaKeysetMutex)
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{
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if (g_ncaKeysetLoaded) ret = (const u8*)(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[kaek_index][key_gen_val]);
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}
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end:
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return ret;
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}
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bool keysDecryptRsaOaepWrappedTitleKey(const void *rsa_wrapped_titlekey, void *out_titlekey)
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{
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if (!rsa_wrapped_titlekey || !out_titlekey)
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{
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LOG_MSG("Invalid parameters!");
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return false;
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}
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bool ret = false;
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SCOPED_LOCK(&g_ncaKeysetMutex)
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{
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if (!g_ncaKeysetLoaded) break;
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size_t out_keydata_size = 0;
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u8 out_keydata[0x100] = {0};
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|
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/* Get eTicket RSA device key. */
|
|
EticketRsaDeviceKey *eticket_rsa_key = (EticketRsaDeviceKey*)g_eTicketRsaDeviceKey.key;
|
|
|
|
/* Perform a RSA-OAEP unwrap operation to get the encrypted titlekey. */
|
|
ret = (rsa2048OaepDecryptAndVerify(out_keydata, sizeof(out_keydata), rsa_wrapped_titlekey, eticket_rsa_key->modulus, eticket_rsa_key->exponent, sizeof(eticket_rsa_key->exponent), \
|
|
g_nullHash, &out_keydata_size) && out_keydata_size >= AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Copy RSA-OAEP unwrapped titlekey. */
|
|
memcpy(out_titlekey, out_keydata, AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
} else {
|
|
LOG_MSG("RSA-OAEP titlekey decryption failed!");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const u8 *keysGetTicketCommonKey(u8 key_generation)
|
|
{
|
|
const u8 *ret = NULL;
|
|
u8 key_gen_val = (key_generation ? (key_generation - 1) : key_generation);
|
|
|
|
if (key_gen_val >= NcaKeyGeneration_Max)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid key generation value! (0x%02X).", key_gen_val);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SCOPED_LOCK(&g_ncaKeysetMutex)
|
|
{
|
|
if (g_ncaKeysetLoaded) ret = (const u8*)(g_ncaKeyset.ticket_common_keys[key_gen_val]);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysIsProductionModulus1xMandatory(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return !utilsIsDevelopmentUnit();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysIsProductionModulus9xMandatory(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return (!utilsIsDevelopmentUnit() && hosversionAtLeast(9, 0, 0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysIsDevelopmentModulus1xMandatory(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return utilsIsDevelopmentUnit();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysIsDevelopmentModulus9xMandatory(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return (utilsIsDevelopmentUnit() && hosversionAtLeast(9, 0, 0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysRetrieveKeysFromProgramMemory(KeysMemoryInfo *info)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!info || !info->key_count)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid parameters!");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
u8 tmp_hash[SHA256_HASH_SIZE];
|
|
bool success = false;
|
|
|
|
if (!memRetrieveProgramMemorySegment(&(info->location))) return false;
|
|
|
|
for(u32 i = 0; i < info->key_count; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
KeysMemoryKey *key = &(info->keys[i]);
|
|
bool found = false, mandatory = (key->mandatory_func != NULL ? key->mandatory_func() : true);
|
|
|
|
if (!key->dst)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid destination pointer for key \"%s\" in program %016lX!", key->name, info->location.program_id);
|
|
if (mandatory) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Hash every key length-sized byte chunk in the process memory buffer until a match is found. */
|
|
for(u64 j = 0; j < info->location.data_size; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
if ((info->location.data_size - j) < key->size) break;
|
|
|
|
sha256CalculateHash(tmp_hash, info->location.data + j, key->size);
|
|
|
|
if (!memcmp(tmp_hash, key->hash, SHA256_HASH_SIZE))
|
|
{
|
|
/* Jackpot. */
|
|
memcpy(key->dst, info->location.data + j, key->size);
|
|
found = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!found)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Unable to locate key \"%s\" in process memory from program %016lX!", key->name, info->location.program_id);
|
|
if (mandatory) goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
success = true;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
memFreeMemoryLocation(&(info->location));
|
|
|
|
return success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysDeriveNcaHeaderKey(void)
|
|
{
|
|
Result rc = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Derive nca_header_kek_sealed from nca_header_kek_source. */
|
|
rc = splCryptoGenerateAesKek(g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_kek_source, 0, 0, g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_kek_sealed);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("splCryptoGenerateAesKek failed! (0x%08X) (nca_header_kek_sealed).", rc);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Derive nca_header_key from nca_header_kek_sealed and nca_header_key_source. */
|
|
rc = splCryptoGenerateAesKey(g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_kek_sealed, g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key_source, g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("splCryptoGenerateAesKey failed! (0x%08X) (nca_header_key, part 1).", rc);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = splCryptoGenerateAesKey(g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_kek_sealed, g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key_source + AES_128_KEY_SIZE, g_ncaKeyset.nca_header_key + AES_128_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("splCryptoGenerateAesKey failed! (0x%08X) (nca_header_key, part 2).", rc);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysDeriveSealedNcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeys(void)
|
|
{
|
|
Result rc = 0;
|
|
u32 key_cnt = 0;
|
|
u8 highest_key_gen = 0;
|
|
bool success = false;
|
|
|
|
for(u8 i = 0; i < NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Count; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Get pointer to current KAEK source. */
|
|
const u8 *nca_kaek_source = (const u8*)(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sources[i]);
|
|
|
|
for(u8 j = 1; j <= NcaKeyGeneration_Max; j++)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Get pointer to current sealed KAEK. */
|
|
u8 key_gen_val = (j - 1);
|
|
u8 *nca_kaek_sealed = g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek_sealed[i][key_gen_val];
|
|
|
|
/* Derive sealed KAEK using the current KAEK source and key generation. */
|
|
rc = splCryptoGenerateAesKek(nca_kaek_source, j, 0, nca_kaek_sealed);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
//LOG_MSG("splCryptoGenerateAesKek failed for KAEK index %u and key generation %u! (0x%08X).", i, (j <= 1 ? 0 : j), rc);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update derived key count and highest key generation value. */
|
|
key_cnt++;
|
|
if (key_gen_val > highest_key_gen) highest_key_gen = key_gen_val;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
success = (key_cnt > 0);
|
|
if (success) LOG_MSG("Derived %u sealed NCA KAEK(s) (%u key generation[s]).", key_cnt, highest_key_gen + 1);
|
|
|
|
return success;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Reads a line from file f and parses out the key and value from it.
|
|
* The format of a line must match /^ *[A-Za-z0-9_] *[,=] *.+$/.
|
|
* If a line ends in \r, the final \r is stripped.
|
|
* The input file is assumed to have been opened with the 'b' flag.
|
|
* The input file is assumed to contain only ASCII.
|
|
*
|
|
* A line cannot exceed 512 bytes in length.
|
|
* Lines that are excessively long will be silently truncated.
|
|
*
|
|
* On success, *key and *value will be set to point to the key and value in
|
|
* the input line, respectively.
|
|
* *key and *value may also be NULL in case of empty lines.
|
|
* On failure, *key and *value will be set to NULL.
|
|
* End of file is considered failure.
|
|
*
|
|
* Because *key and *value will point to a static buffer, their contents must be
|
|
* copied before calling this function again.
|
|
* For the same reason, this function is not thread-safe.
|
|
*
|
|
* The key will be converted to lowercase.
|
|
* An empty key is considered a parse error, but an empty value is returned as
|
|
* success.
|
|
*
|
|
* This function assumes that the file can be trusted not to contain any NUL in
|
|
* the contents.
|
|
*
|
|
* Whitespace (' ', ASCII 0x20, as well as '\t', ASCII 0x09) at the beginning of
|
|
* the line, at the end of the line as well as around = (or ,) will be ignored.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param f the file to read
|
|
* @param key pointer to change to point to the key
|
|
* @param value pointer to change to point to the value
|
|
* @return 0 on success,
|
|
* 1 on end of file,
|
|
* -1 on parse error (line too long, line malformed)
|
|
* -2 on I/O error
|
|
*/
|
|
static int keysGetKeyAndValueFromFile(FILE *f, char **key, char **value)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!f || !key || !value)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid parameters!");
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define SKIP_SPACE(p) do {\
|
|
for (; (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t'); ++p);\
|
|
} while(0);
|
|
|
|
static char line[512] = {0};
|
|
char *k, *v, *p, *end;
|
|
|
|
*key = *value = NULL;
|
|
|
|
errno = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (fgets(line, (int)sizeof(line), f) == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
if (feof(f))
|
|
{
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return -2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (errno != 0) return -2;
|
|
|
|
if (*line == '\n' || *line == '\r' || *line == '\0') return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Not finding \r or \n is not a problem.
|
|
* The line might just be exactly 512 characters long, we have no way to
|
|
* tell.
|
|
* Additionally, it's possible that the last line of a file is not actually
|
|
* a line (i.e., does not end in '\n'); we do want to handle those.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((p = strchr(line, '\r')) != NULL || (p = strchr(line, '\n')) != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
end = p;
|
|
*p = '\0';
|
|
} else {
|
|
end = (line + strlen(line) + 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p = line;
|
|
SKIP_SPACE(p);
|
|
k = p;
|
|
|
|
/* Validate key and convert to lower case. */
|
|
for (; *p != ' ' && *p != ',' && *p != '\t' && *p != '='; ++p)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*p == '\0') return -1;
|
|
|
|
if (*p >= 'A' && *p <= 'Z')
|
|
{
|
|
*p = 'a' + (*p - 'A');
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*p != '_' && (*p < '0' && *p > '9') && (*p < 'a' && *p > 'z')) return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Bail if the final ++p put us at the end of string. */
|
|
if (*p == '\0') return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* We should be at the end of key now and either whitespace or [,=] follows. */
|
|
if (*p == '=' || *p == ',')
|
|
{
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
} else {
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
SKIP_SPACE(p);
|
|
if (*p != '=' && *p != ',') return -1;
|
|
*p++ = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Empty key is an error. */
|
|
if (*k == '\0') return -1;
|
|
|
|
SKIP_SPACE(p);
|
|
v = p;
|
|
|
|
/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
|
|
for (p = end - 1; *p == '\t' || *p == ' '; --p);
|
|
|
|
*(p + 1) = '\0';
|
|
|
|
*key = k;
|
|
*value = v;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#undef SKIP_SPACE
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static char keysConvertHexCharToBinary(char c)
|
|
{
|
|
if ('a' <= c && c <= 'f') return (c - 'a' + 0xA);
|
|
if ('A' <= c && c <= 'F') return (c - 'A' + 0xA);
|
|
if ('0' <= c && c <= '9') return (c - '0');
|
|
return 'z';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysParseHexKey(u8 *out, const char *key, const char *value, u32 size)
|
|
{
|
|
u32 hex_str_len = (2 * size);
|
|
size_t value_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!out || !key || !*key || !value || !(value_len = strlen(value)) || !size)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid parameters!");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (value_len != hex_str_len)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Key \"%s\" must be %u hex digits long!", key, hex_str_len);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(out, 0, size);
|
|
|
|
for(u32 i = 0; i < hex_str_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
char val = keysConvertHexCharToBinary(value[i]);
|
|
if (val == 'z')
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid hex character in key \"%s\" at position %u!", key, i);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((i & 1) == 0) val <<= 4;
|
|
out[i >> 1] |= val;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysReadKeysFromFile(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
u32 key_count = 0;
|
|
FILE *keys_file = NULL;
|
|
char *key = NULL, *value = NULL;
|
|
char test_name[0x40] = {0};
|
|
bool parse_fail = false, eticket_rsa_kek_available = false;
|
|
|
|
keys_file = fopen(KEYS_FILE_PATH, "rb");
|
|
if (!keys_file)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Unable to open \"%s\" to retrieve keys!", KEYS_FILE_PATH);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while(true)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = keysGetKeyAndValueFromFile(keys_file, &key, &value);
|
|
if (ret == 1 || ret == -2) break; /* Break from the while loop if EOF is reached or if an I/O error occurs. */
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore malformed lines. */
|
|
if (ret != 0 || !key || !value) continue;
|
|
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(key, "eticket_rsa_kek"))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((parse_fail = !keysParseHexKey(g_ncaKeyset.eticket_rsa_kek, key, value, sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.eticket_rsa_kek)))) break;
|
|
eticket_rsa_kek_available = true;
|
|
key_count++;
|
|
} else
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(key, "eticket_rsa_kek_personalized"))
|
|
{
|
|
/* This only appears on consoles that use the new PRODINFO key generation scheme. */
|
|
if ((parse_fail = !keysParseHexKey(g_ncaKeyset.eticket_rsa_kek_personalized, key, value, sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.eticket_rsa_kek_personalized)))) break;
|
|
eticket_rsa_kek_available = true;
|
|
key_count++;
|
|
} else {
|
|
for(u32 i = 0; i < NcaKeyGeneration_Max; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
snprintf(test_name, sizeof(test_name), "titlekek_%02x", i);
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(key, test_name))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((parse_fail = !keysParseHexKey(g_ncaKeyset.ticket_common_keys[i], key, value, sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.ticket_common_keys[i])))) break;
|
|
key_count++;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(test_name, sizeof(test_name), "key_area_key_application_%02x", i);
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(key, test_name))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((parse_fail = !keysParseHexKey(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Application][i], key, value, \
|
|
sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Application][i])))) break;
|
|
key_count++;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(test_name, sizeof(test_name), "key_area_key_ocean_%02x", i);
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(key, test_name))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((parse_fail = !keysParseHexKey(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Ocean][i], key, value, \
|
|
sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_Ocean][i])))) break;
|
|
key_count++;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(test_name, sizeof(test_name), "key_area_key_system_%02x", i);
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(key, test_name))
|
|
{
|
|
if ((parse_fail = !keysParseHexKey(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_System][i], key, value, \
|
|
sizeof(g_ncaKeyset.nca_kaek[NcaKeyAreaEncryptionKeyIndex_System][i])))) break;
|
|
key_count++;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (parse_fail) break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fclose(keys_file);
|
|
|
|
if (parse_fail || !key_count)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!key_count) LOG_MSG("Unable to parse necessary keys from \"%s\"! (keys file empty?).", KEYS_FILE_PATH);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!eticket_rsa_kek_available)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("\"eticket_rsa_kek\" unavailable in \"%s\"!", KEYS_FILE_PATH);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysGetDecryptedEticketRsaDeviceKey(void)
|
|
{
|
|
Result rc = 0;
|
|
u32 public_exponent = 0;
|
|
const u8 *eticket_rsa_kek = NULL;
|
|
EticketRsaDeviceKey *eticket_rsa_key = NULL;
|
|
Aes128CtrContext eticket_aes_ctx = {0};
|
|
|
|
/* Get eTicket RSA device key. */
|
|
rc = setcalGetEticketDeviceKey(&g_eTicketRsaDeviceKey);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("setcalGetEticketDeviceKey failed! (0x%08X).", rc);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get eTicket RSA device key encryption key. */
|
|
eticket_rsa_kek = (const u8*)(g_eTicketRsaDeviceKey.generation > 0 ? g_ncaKeyset.eticket_rsa_kek_personalized : g_ncaKeyset.eticket_rsa_kek);
|
|
|
|
/* Decrypt eTicket RSA device key. */
|
|
eticket_rsa_key = (EticketRsaDeviceKey*)g_eTicketRsaDeviceKey.key;
|
|
aes128CtrContextCreate(&eticket_aes_ctx, eticket_rsa_kek, eticket_rsa_key->ctr);
|
|
aes128CtrCrypt(&eticket_aes_ctx, &(eticket_rsa_key->exponent), &(eticket_rsa_key->exponent), sizeof(EticketRsaDeviceKey) - sizeof(eticket_rsa_key->ctr));
|
|
|
|
/* Public exponent value must be 0x10001. */
|
|
/* It is stored using big endian byte order. */
|
|
public_exponent = __builtin_bswap32(eticket_rsa_key->public_exponent);
|
|
if (public_exponent != ETICKET_RSA_DEVICE_KEY_PUBLIC_EXPONENT)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid public exponent for decrypted eTicket RSA device key! Wrong keys? (0x%08X).", public_exponent);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test RSA key pair. */
|
|
if (!keysTestEticketRsaDeviceKey(&(eticket_rsa_key->public_exponent), eticket_rsa_key->exponent, eticket_rsa_key->modulus))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("eTicket RSA device key test failed! Wrong keys?");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool keysTestEticketRsaDeviceKey(const void *e, const void *d, const void *n)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!e || !d || !n)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid parameters!");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Result rc = 0;
|
|
u8 x[0x100] = {0}, y[0x100] = {0}, z[0x100] = {0};
|
|
|
|
/* 0xCAFEBABE. */
|
|
x[0xFC] = 0xCA;
|
|
x[0xFD] = 0xFE;
|
|
x[0xFE] = 0xBA;
|
|
x[0xFF] = 0xBE;
|
|
|
|
rc = splUserExpMod(x, n, d, 0x100, y);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("splUserExpMod failed! (#1) (0x%08X).", rc);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = splUserExpMod(y, n, e, 4, z);
|
|
if (R_FAILED(rc))
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("splUserExpMod failed! (#2) (0x%08X).", rc);
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (memcmp(x, z, 0x100) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
LOG_MSG("Invalid RSA key pair!");
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|