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Atmosphere/exosphere/program/source/smc/secmon_smc_register_access.cpp

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2018-2020 Atmosphère-NX
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms and conditions of the GNU General Public License,
* version 2, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope it will be useful, but WITHOUT
* ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or
* FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for
* more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
#include <exosphere.hpp>
#include "../secmon_error.hpp"
#include "secmon_smc_register_access.hpp"
namespace ams::secmon::smc {
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namespace {
template<size_t N>
constexpr void SetRegisterTableAllowed(std::array<u8, N> &arr, uintptr_t reg) {
/* All registers should be four byte aligned. */
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AMS_ASSUME(reg % sizeof(u32) == 0);
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/* Reduce the register to an index. */
reg /= sizeof(u32);
/* Get the index and mask. */
const auto index = reg / BITSIZEOF(u8);
const auto mask = (1u << (reg % BITSIZEOF(u8)));
/* Check that the permission bit isn't already set. */
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AMS_ASSUME((arr[index] & mask) == 0);
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/* Set the permission bit. */
arr[index] |= mask;
/* Ensure that indices are set in sorted order. */
for (auto i = (reg % BITSIZEOF(u8)) + 1; i < 8; ++i) {
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AMS_ASSUME((arr[index] & (1u << i)) == 0);
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}
for (auto i = index + 1; i < arr.size(); ++i) {
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AMS_ASSUME(arr[i] == 0);
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}
}
template<size_t N>
consteval std::pair<size_t, size_t> GetReducedAccessTableInfo(const std::array<u8, N> &arr) {
for (int last = arr.size() - 1; last >= 0; --last) {
if (arr[last] != 0) {
const int end = last + 1;
for (int start = 0; start < end; ++start) {
if (arr[start] != 0) {
return std::make_pair(static_cast<size_t>(start), static_cast<size_t>(end));
}
}
return std::make_pair(static_cast<size_t>(0), static_cast<size_t>(end));
}
}
/* All empty perm table is disallowed. */
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AMS_ASSUME(false);
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}
template<u32 _Address, auto RawTable>
struct AccessTable {
static constexpr inline auto ReducedAccessTableInfo = GetReducedAccessTableInfo(RawTable);
static constexpr inline size_t ReducedAccessTableSize = ReducedAccessTableInfo.second - ReducedAccessTableInfo.first;
static constexpr inline auto ReducedAccessTable = []() -> std::array<u8, ReducedAccessTableSize> {
std::array<u8, ReducedAccessTableSize> reduced = {};
for (size_t i = ReducedAccessTableInfo.first; i < ReducedAccessTableInfo.second; ++i) {
reduced[i - ReducedAccessTableInfo.first] = RawTable[i];
}
return reduced;
}();
static constexpr u32 Address = _Address + (ReducedAccessTableInfo.first * sizeof(u32) * BITSIZEOF(u8));
static constexpr u32 Size = static_cast<u32>(ReducedAccessTableSize * sizeof(u32) * BITSIZEOF(u8));
static_assert(Size <= 0x1000);
};
struct AccessTableEntry {
const u8 * const table;
uintptr_t virtual_address;
u32 address;
u32 size;
};
/* Include the access tables. */
#include "secmon_define_pmc_access_table.inc"
#include "secmon_define_mc_access_table.inc"
#include "secmon_define_mc01_access_table.inc"
constexpr const AccessTableEntry AccessTables[] = {
{ PmcAccessTable::ReducedAccessTable.data(), MemoryRegionVirtualDevicePmc.GetAddress(), PmcAccessTable::Address, PmcAccessTable::Size, },
{ McAccessTable::ReducedAccessTable.data(), MemoryRegionVirtualDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress(), McAccessTable::Address, McAccessTable::Size, },
{ Mc01AccessTable::ReducedAccessTable.data(), MemoryRegionVirtualDeviceMemoryController0.GetAddress(), Mc01AccessTable::Address + MemoryRegionPhysicalDeviceMemoryController0.GetAddress(), Mc01AccessTable::Size, },
{ Mc01AccessTable::ReducedAccessTable.data(), MemoryRegionVirtualDeviceMemoryController1.GetAddress(), Mc01AccessTable::Address + MemoryRegionPhysicalDeviceMemoryController1.GetAddress(), Mc01AccessTable::Size, },
};
constexpr bool IsAccessAllowed(const AccessTableEntry &entry, uintptr_t address) {
/* Check if the address is within range. */
if (!(entry.address <= address && address < entry.address + entry.size)) {
return false;
}
/* Get the offset. */
const auto offset = address - entry.address;
/* Convert it to an index. */
const auto reg_index = offset / sizeof(u32);
/* Get the bit fields. */
const auto index = reg_index / BITSIZEOF(u8);
const auto mask = (1u << (reg_index % BITSIZEOF(u8)));
/* Validate that we're not going out of bounds. */
if (index >= entry.size / sizeof(u32)) {
return false;
}
return (entry.table[index] & mask) != 0;
}
constexpr const AccessTableEntry *GetAccessTableEntry(uintptr_t address) {
for (const auto &entry : AccessTables) {
if (IsAccessAllowed(entry, address)) {
return std::addressof(entry);
}
}
return nullptr;
}
}
SmcResult SmcReadWriteRegister(SmcArguments &args) {
/* Get the arguments. */
const uintptr_t address = args.r[1];
const u32 mask = args.r[2];
const u32 value = args.r[3];
/* Validate that the address is aligned. */
SMC_R_UNLESS(util::IsAligned(address, alignof(u32)), InvalidArgument);
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/* Find the access table. */
const AccessTableEntry * const entry = GetAccessTableEntry(address);
/* Translate our entry into an address to access. */
uintptr_t virtual_address = 0;
if (entry != nullptr) {
/* Get the address to read or write. */
virtual_address = entry->virtual_address + (address - entry->address);
} else {
/* For no clearly discernable reason, SmcReadWriteRegister returns success despite not doing the read/write */
/* when accessing the SMMU controls for the BPMP and for APB-DMA. */
/* This is "probably" to fuck with hackers who got access to the SMC and are trying to get control of the */
/* BPMP to exploit jamais vu, deja vu, or other related DMA/wake-from-sleep vulnerabilities. */
constexpr uintptr_t MC = MemoryRegionPhysicalDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress();
SMC_R_UNLESS((address == (MC + MC_SMMU_AVPC_ASID) || address == (MC + MC_SMMU_PPCS1_ASID)), InvalidArgument);
/* For backwards compatibility, we'll allow access to these devices on 1.0.0. */
if (GetTargetFirmware() < TargetFirmware_2_0_0) {
virtual_address = MemoryRegionVirtualDeviceMemoryController.GetAddress() + (address - MC);
}
}
/* Perform the read or write, if we should. */
if (virtual_address != 0) {
u32 out = 0;
if (mask != ~static_cast<u32>(0)) {
out = reg::Read(virtual_address);
}
if (mask != static_cast<u32>(0)) {
reg::Write(virtual_address, (out & ~mask) | (value & mask));
}
args.r[1] = out;
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}
return SmcResult::Success;
}
}